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Resumo
Nos dias de hoje, o tema da segurança da informação é um tema sensível para qual-
quer organização. Hoje em dia, é cada vez mais fácil para um indivíduo com intenções
maliciosas obter acesso a informação ilegítima e/ ou causar danos aos dados disponibi-
lizados pelas empresas. Numa altura em que os ataques informáticos são cada vez mais
elaborados, é vital para qualquer entidade possuir uma defesa física e tecnológica robusta.
A cada mês que passa, o número de vulnerabilidades descobertas facilmente supera o nú-
mero do mês anterior e é ultrapassado pelo número do mês seguinte[36][60], e a falta de
sensibilidade na matéria pode levar à exploração de uma vulnerabilidade com sucesso por
parte de um individuo mal-intencionado. Qualquer organização deve estar ativamente em
prevenção sobre as suas infraestruturas, por forma a precaver qualquer vulnerabilidade
que possa vir a ser descoberta, e prevenindo que a mesma seja explorada, não apenas de-
vido a obrigações legais, mas também pelo impacto que um ataque possa ter na imagem e
negócio da mesma organização. Nasce desta forma uma nova área nas organizações com
fim a proteger as mesmas desta nova realidade, a cibersegurança.
A cibersegurança consiste no conjunto de pessoas, processos e práticas que visa a
proteção de redes, computadores, programas e informação de ataque, dano ou acesso
ilícito[41]. Esta é avaliada principalmente através de três propriedades: confidencialidade,
disponibilidade e integridade[14]. Qualquer uma destas três propriedades quando violada
coloca todo o ecossistema da organização em risco.
Este projeto denominado de Continuous Security Assessment, encontra-se no âmbito
da dissertação do Mestrado em Segurança Informática (MSI) da Faculdade de Ciências da
Universidade de Lisboa (FCUL), e resulta de uma parceria entre a Fundação da Faculdade
de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa(FFCUL) e a Portugal Telecom (PT)[56]. A PT,
sendo uma das principais entidades a operar em Portugal, possui uma direção dedicada à
segurança e privacidade da informação, a Direção de Cyber Security and Privacy (DCY).
A DCY detém vários projetos que visam a segurança da infraestrutura da PT, um destes é
o CyberWatch.
O projeto CyberWatch tem o propósito de controlar e rever de forma contínua a ci-
bersegurança do ecossistema PT, mais concretamente, abrange um conjunto de processos
que visam consciencializar os recursos quanto a novas ameaças na web, novas vulnera-
bilidades, como ainda no aperfeiçoamento das pessoas, processos e tecnologias. Um dos
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processos do projeto CyberWatch consiste na deteção, reporte e acompanhamento da evo-
lução das vulnerabilidades nos ativos PT, processo em que esta tese está inserida, mais
especificamente, visa a descoberta e acompanhamento de vulnerabilidades recorrendo ao
uso de ferramentas de vulnerability scanning.
No ano de 2015/2016 a FCUL e a PT associaram-se e foi realizado o projeto “Desen-
volvimento de um processo automático de Gestão de Vulnerabilidades de Cibersegurança
em ambientes de grande dimensão”, cujos objetivos foram os seguintes:
• Ponto central para gerir o agendamento de scans de vulnerabilidades a ativos PT.
• Gestão central dos vários scanners de vulnerabilidades à disposição da PT, indepen-
dentemente da tecnologia.
• Transmissão dos resultados para os repositórios de dados da DCY.
O resultado final deste projeto foi a criação de uma plataforma cujo nome é Vulnera-
bility Assessment Coordinator (VAC). O VAC foi desenvolvido tendo por base as necessi-
dades da PT na altura. O projeto de Continuous Security Assessment, é uma extensão sig-
nificativa do projeto descrito anteriormente, agora enquadrado no programa de desenvol-
vimento CyberWatch, e visa numa primeira instância responder às limitações/problemas
atuais do VAC:
• Dificuldade no uso da ferramenta.
• Falta de interoperabilidade com outras tecnologias de vulnerability scanning.
• Controlo e integração com os repositórios de informação da PT.
• Impossibilidade de integração dos resultados num contexto do software Maltego.1
Tendo em consideração os problemas descritos anteriormente, esta tese propôs-se a
atingir as seguintes contribuições:
• Melhoria do software VAC - esta transformação dará origem a uma nova versão
do software que se passará a denominar por VACv2-, mais concretamente, tornar a
ferramenta escalável quanto a tecnologias de vulnerability scanning e tipos de scan,
melhorar a usabilidade da ferramenta, e proteger a própria ferramenta de acessos
ilícitos.
• Adição de uma nova tecnologia de vulnerability scanning ao VACv2 - Qualys
Cloud-based.
1O Maltego trata-se de um software especializado em correlação de dados.
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• Melhoria do módulo de resultados do VACv2, e providenciar o controlo do mesmo
ao utilizador. Também inserido neste ponto está o correlacionamento dos resultados
dos scans por parte do Maltego.
O VACv2 é um esforço para evitar que todo o trabalho dispensado na realização do
VAC seja em vão. O VACv2 permite um maior facilitismo na configuração de scans pe-
riódicos, não sendo agora imputada responsabilidade ao operador por fazer a gestão dos
ativos por cada plataforma de vulnerability scanning, e ainda, no tratamento dos resulta-
dos dos scans, sendo que é também objetivo que o VACv2 permita uma gestão centra-
lizada das vulnerabilidades existentes em toda a infraestrutura da PT. Por fim, algo de
inovador é o Maltego, software que visa a correlação de dados, recolher os dados asso-
ciados aos resultados scans e correlacionar os mesmos com os dados vindos de outras
plataformas a fim de facilitar o trabalho de outras equipas que têm a função de responder
e mitigar eventos de segurança na PT, nomeadamente a equipa do Security Operations
Center(SOC).
Palavras-chave: Cibersegurança; CyberWatch; Vulnerabilidades; VACv2
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Abstract
Nowadays, Information Security is a sensitive issue for any company. Portugal Tele-
com is one of the most influential companies in Portugal, and to provide confidence to
the general public, partners, and stakeholders, it must have a well-defined procedure for
securing information. One of PT’s procedures to prevent potential attacks is to check its
infrastructures for unknown vulnerabilities periodically. To help to find vulnerabilities
present in their systems, PT has acquired scanning technologies. However, these tech-
nologies are highly dependent on human interaction.
In the past, there has been one thesis in which the final solution - which name is Vul-
nerability Assessment Coordinator (VAC) - consisted of a centralized point for managing
and orchestrating scans of PT’s critical assets. However, this software never made it to a
production environment due to its growing limitations. It is in this context that this master
thesis - Continuous Security Assessment - is located. This thesis proposes to achieve the
following goals:
• Improvement of VAC Overall enhancement of the tool, making its scalable regard-
ing technologies, improving usability, and protecting its data from unwanted access;
• Addition of a new Scanning Technology into VACv2 addition of the new scanning
technology, Qualys, and meeting its requirements;
• Results treating & Data correlation - Improving the results manager module and
providing control to the operator, and allowing data correlation.
This master thesis will take advantage of the software already developed by the other
master thesis and will improve the usability of it, while also making it independent of
any scanning technologies and scanning types. One other feature that will be intended
for this thesis is the possibility of correlating the scan results provided by the scanning
technologies with other sources with resort to specialized software for data correlation.
Keywords: Vulnerabilities; Continuous Security Assessment; VAC; Centralized;
Scanning Technologies
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The Internet was an unprecedented achievement that until this day is still revolutionizing
the world in new unimaginable ways. The last few years were crucial, an example of
such is the introduction of the term “Internet-of-Things” which refers to the time of when
more “things/devices” will be connected to the internet than humans. However, and this
comes with no surprise, most of the devices available to the general public are vulnerable
concerning cybersecurity. Let’s take for example the waterfall model, which consists
in dividing the development of a product into multiple stages. Most companies would
consider security as being a step in this model. However, the “security” of the product
should be enforced in every step of this model, not only because security aspects change
according to the stage the product is, but also because security is not something that one
adds into the system, like another functionality. Security must be present from the starting
of the product until the end of its lifecycle.
Because companies can be both client and manufacturer, they need to be aware of
vulnerabilities in their systems, not only for legal and criminal reasons but also because
of the impact that a successful attack could have into the business and image of the or-
ganization. To help companies being aware of their vulnerabilities, some organizations
are focused on offering solutions that its purpose is to find vulnerabilities in systems or
websites.
Portugal Telecom (PT) being one of the most influential companies in Portugal, and
a reference in the telecommunications area, to provide confidence to the general public,
partners and stakeholders, it has a well-defined procedure for the discovery of vulnerabil-
ities and an action plan for when one is encountered, to prevent the exploitation of such
vulnerability by a malicious attacker. To find these vulnerabilities, PT has acquired a
few technologies for discovering vulnerabilities. However, these technologies are highly
dependent on human interaction.
It is in this context that this master thesis - Continuous Security Assessment - is lo-
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cated, it is intended that the project of this thesis is based on one solution previously
developed which was the project of another thesis, the software was named Vulnerability
Assessment Coordinator, and is a centralized point for managing and orchestrating scans
to PT’s critical assets.
1.2 Objectives
The project of Continuous Security Assessment intends to improve the actual procedure of
vulnerability assessment done by Portugal Telecom, this is assured by PT’s Cybersecurity
Direction (DCY). The procedure of vulnerability assessment is currently being done on
critical assets only, and with resort to two scanning technologies, OpenVAS and Nexpose.
However, the process associated with the management of actual scans, or configuration
of new scans is exceptionally time-wasting becoming inefficient the use of the scanning
technologies, not to mention that the procedures associated with this tasks are incredibly
repetitive.
For those reasons, DCY has thought in developing a software in which it would man-
age the scanning technologies autonomously and orchestrate the launch of scans, while
also uploading the results into DCY’s information repositories systems. This software
was the final product of one other master thesis, and the final name of the solution was
Vulnerability Assessment Coordinator (VAC), but VAC got deprecated even before start-
ing its operation for two reasons. The first was that it was built to work with the OpenVAS
and Nexpose scanning technologies only, and the second is that it was incredibly difficult
to use the full capabilities of the solution.
The Continuous Security Assessment project is the result of PT deciding not to waste
all the effort spent in VAC, this project’s objectives are:
Improvement of VAC Overall enhancement of the tool, making its scalable regarding
technologies, improving usability, and protecting its data from unwanted access;
Addition of a new Scanning Technology into VACv2 addition of the new scanning tech-
nology, Qualys, and meeting its requirements;
Results treating & Data correlation - Improving the results manager module and pro-
viding control to the operator.
This project comes at a time in which PT is acquiring a new scanning technology
and is letting go Nexpose, thence the disassociation of scanning technologies from VAC,
to avoid the need of development if this situation occurs again in the future. Also, the
project will seek to automate the procedure of vulnerability assessment currently handly
by DCY’s personnel something that the earlier version of VAC failed.
However, the last objective is not focused on the same technology as the remaining.
The last objective will be over software that is focused on the correlation of information.
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This software, named Maltego, will be handled mainly by the Security Operation Center
team (SOC), what this last objective pretends it to allow the correlation of data from other
sources of PT with the results produced by the scanning technologies, something that until
this moment was not being done.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis actively contributed to the improvement of a tool - VAC - that was being
unused by PT, and allowed a more natural data correlation between the results produced
by such platform and other sources of information. Let’s have a look at the contribution
achieved by this thesis.
VAC changed its name into VACv2 because of the project done by this thesis. Con-
cerning VAC, VACv2 is now more secure thanks to the ciphered communication client-
server, authentication of users against PT’s Active Directory through the Kerberos pro-
tocol, and checking if they have permission to access VACv2. The tool is now more
user-friendly by allowing the user to edit any object created - something that VAC was
not capable of -, and also fetches all the data possible in order to present to the user
when configuring any object in the platform - something VAC did not do. VACv2 is now
detached from any scanning technology or scanning type, it is also detached from any
information repository belonging to PT, and the operator has control of every single ob-
ject in the platform. This master thesis had one other feature which was a development
not directly involved with the primary software - VACv2. This development consisted in
extending the capabilities of a specialized software in correlating data - named Maltego
-, by making it fetch the results of the scans provided by VACv2 and correlating it with
other sources of information.
In PT’s real environment the project will contribute to at least four entities, let’s ana-
lyze them in more detail:
DCY/Cybersecurity Engineering Team (CSE) - This is the team, that will gain most
with VACv2 development and deployment to a production environment, because it
is this team’s responsibility to perform the tasks that VACv2 will automize, tasks
like the scan configuration, scan management across the different scanning tech-
nologies, and scan schedulings.
DCY/Vulnerability Assessment and Management Team (VAM) - This is the teamwhich
is currently doing all the post-processing of the scan results produced by the differ-
ent scanning technologies, which if the results come from different platforms, it
would be normal if they had different structures. VACv2 will not only uniformize
these results into a single format but will also be a centralized point for manag-
ing the existing vulnerabilities. In other words, VACv2 will perform all the post-
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processing of the results accordingly to what is configured in the system and will
upload the values into DCY’s data analytics platforms.
DCY/Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) - In a nutshell, VACv2 will
upload its values into DCY’s data analytics platforms. From these platforms, it will
be possible for a specific software - Maltego - to fetch the scan results, to correlate
the scans data with information provided by other sources, this way easing CSIRT’s
work concerning if a given asset is or not vulnerable.
PT - If everything is achieved as it is expected with this project, PT will take a big leap
regarding the quality of its cybersecurity. In more detail, it will be more aware of
possible points of entry regarding vulnerabilities in its ecosystem, and will be able
to take quick measures to mitigate the risk of possible exploitation of a vulnerability
or even a possible intrusion.
1.4 Document Structure
This report is structured as it follows:
Chapter 2: Vulnerabilities - This chapter intends to introduce a small introduction for
what is considered to be the base for this projects, Vulnerabilities. It will be ex-
plained what is considered to be a vulnerability, its possible impact, and the motive
for discovering vulnerabilities, its lifecycle and so forth.
Chapter 3: VAC - This chapter intends to describe the product of the previous master
thesis from were VAC was developed. It will provide a high-level detail of the
software.
This chapter is required because there is no other source to get information about
what this technology is or how it works, and it is not possible to explain what was
done in this thesis without explaining the state of art of this software.
Chapter 4: Design for VACv2 - This chapter contains the original ideas for this master
thesis. In other words, it describes what the intentions were for this project to
achieve, and the time-schedule for this project.
Chapter 5: Development of VACv2 - This chapter details what was done in VACv2 to
achieve the objectives defined in chapter four, and it also illustrates the state of the
art for VACv2.
Chapter 6: Evaluation - This chapter compares and presents the differences between
VACv2 and the procedures DCY staff had to make to achieve the same result. It
also illustrates an example of the events being uploaded by VACv2.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion & Future Work - This chapter contains the summary of what
was done and achieved with this project. It also presents a few ideas that are possible
to explore in order to enhance VACv2 software.

Chapter 2
Vulnerabilities
“Securing a computer system has traditionally been a battle of wits: the penetrator tries
to find the holes, and the designer tries to close them.” - M. Gosser [10]
Vulnerabilities are emerging at an astonishing pace in this digital era we are living in,
and if not adequately addressed it might contain the power to send the world back to the
Stone Age.
Vulnerabilities are the foundation of this thesis and are going to be addressed in this
chapter. There is no standard definition of what a vulnerability is, but organizations tend
to outline it similarly.
In this section, it will be analyzed how world-wide organizations define a vulnerabil-
ity. It will also address the impact of vulnerabilities and why it is essential to seek for
them within the organization’s network perimeter, among other features.
2.1 Definition
The word “vulnerability” is a noun used when to describe something that is vulnerable.
According to the English thesaurus the word “vulnerable” can be described as “open to
assault; difficult to defend”[11].
Let’s have a look at how world-wide agencies, institutes, and organizations define a
vulnerability:
CERT
“A vulnerability is a software defect that allows an attacker to violate an explicit (or
implicit) security policy to achieve some impact (or consequence).”[3]
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
“A weakness in the computational logic (e.g., code) found in software and hardware com-
ponents that, when exploited, results in a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, or
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availability...”[4]
ENISA
“The existence of a weakness, design, or implementation error that can lead to an un-
expected, undesirable event [G.11] compromising the security of the computer system,
network, application, or protocol involved. (ITSEC)”[6]
IETF - RFC 4949
“A flaw or weakness in a system’s design, implementation, or operation and management
that could be exploited to violate the system’s security policy.”[7]
ISO - ISO 27005
“A weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be exploited by one or more threats.”[37]
In a nutshell, a vulnerability is a flaw in the hardware or software that when exploited
compromises the enterprise’s information, thus leading to a violation of one or more of
the following properties:
• Confidentiality
• Integrity
• Availability
These three properties, also known as the CIA triad, make a model which was de-
signed to guide policies for information security within an organization.[44]
2.2 Impact of a Vulnerability
According to Intel, the impact of a vulnerability is what “describes the type of harm an
attack could cause if the vulnerability were exploited” [8], also they categorize it into
three types:
Priviledge Escalation This type refers to vulnerabilities that allow a malicious user to
elevate its privileges on a compromised system.
Information Disclosure This type refers to vulnerabilities that if exploited could provide
access to classified information.
Denial of service This types refers to vulnerabilities that if exploited could prevent the
access of authorized personnel to the system.
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It is easy to understand why Intel categorized the impact into three types because each of
the types will directly violate one of the properties belonging to the CIA triad. However,
and regardless of the vulnerability type or the impact, what will always come out weak-
ened is the company’s reputation which is crucial for a successful business. A company’s
reputation is what provides confidence to customers and stakeholders.
For an organization to gain confidence within its target audience, it is a long and slow
process. An attack upon any organization would have an immediate negative effect on
its audience’s confidence, and to regain such confidence would only get harder. These
factors will turn the company’s care not to spread bad publicity like the one generated
by a successful attack, in others words, organizations have now motivation for finding
vulnerabilities within its systems.
2.3 Motivation for finding Vulnerabilities
In May of 2017, the world witnessed a massive cyber attack, probably the biggest one so
far, causing an impact at a world-wide scale, it became known as WannaCry[66], and it
was a crypto worm. It managed to affect financial services, healthcare systems, telco com-
panies, and so on. The targets were computers running the Microsoft Windows operating
system.
WannaCry can be divided into three components, the first focused on exploiting a
vulnerability to gain access to the targeted systems, the second was focused on getting
Kernel mode for running instructions, in order for the third to cipher the system.
WannaCry compromised the systems through the exploitation of two critical vulner-
abilities, one was in the Server Message Block protocol version 1 (SMBv1), which if
exploited allowed the execution of arbitrary code in Kernel mode, the National Security
Agency of America developed this exploit and named it EternalBlue[65]. The second
component also developed by the NSA was known as DoublePulsar[64], and was re-
sponsible for implanting a backdoor in the compromised system, while also copying the
WannaCry worm into the system and then executing the code.
Companies must prevent at all costs what happened with WannaCry. This event man-
aged to affect the delivery of service by companies, hospitals and more. The WannaCry
attack could have been prevented through the installation of the corresponding patches
into the vulnerable systems, which were released a couple of months earlier. However,
companies are often hesitant to install such patches due to the possibility of it impacting
the service.
Organizations also have to be preemptive instead of reactive. There should be period-
ical scans of their systems to prevent the existence of a vulnerability, but more important
to mitigate the risk of exploitation by a malicious user.
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2.4 Stages of a Vulnerability
Vulnerabilities exist on account of poor design or development. Nowadays, companies
face an aggressive opposition from other companies, and when facing the dilemma of
deciding between “Functionality or security?”, the second option tends to be left behind
most times.
An example of such are release dates, and security is often set on the verge of the
release schedule with barely any time to audit the product or make changes regarding
the results of such audit. Faster products rather than more secure ones seem to be a vast
choice, and everyone loses with this option over the long term.
According to Correia and Sousa (2010) [19] there are three occasions in which a
vulnerability could be introduced into the product:
• Designing the solution
• Developing the software
• After the product release
Each one of the stages should not be underrated. Each one of the following examples
illustrate a possible decision contributing to a less secure final solution, e.g.:
At Design phase If the cipher algorithm is not chosen correctly it could impact the in-
tegrity of data managed by the product.
At Development stage When facing a network application if the requests performed by
users were not sanitized correctly, it could allow malicious code to be executed.
At Product release If the database original passwords were not changed.
Illustration 2.1 depicts that, in the worst possible scenario, when security is not taken
seriously at each of these three phases, the exposure to an attack will increase.
To avoid such a problem, while designing the product, it should be considered possible
attack vectors through the identification of hazards and threats. When in development,
multiple actions could prevent the introduction of a vulnerability, actions like running a
penetration test over the product, or through the use of code analyzers. Finally, when
the product is released the risk can be mitigated by placing a firewall, or a WAF (Web
Application Firewall) between the user and the product, and periodically penetration tests
can be done, amongst other options.
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Figure 2.1: Introduction of vulnerabilities at each stage.
2.5 Malicious Software
Malicious Software orMalware, consists of any piece of software with the intent of caus-
ing harm to a user, computer or network.1 Malware can take many forms.
2.5.1 Malware Classes
There are multiple types of malware, the following descriptions are according to Cisco
Security Research & Operation Sector [15] and to Kaspersky’s Labs [39]. The last point
mentions more malware types. However, they will not be addressed in further details.
Virus Whenever executed, viruses replicate themselves by inserting its code onto other
computer files.
Worms Opposed to viruses, a worm consists of a standalone program with the purpose
of replicating itself through the network via the infected machine’s network con-
nections.
Trojans Comes from the Ancient Greek story of a deceptive wooden horse that led to
the fall of the city of Troy. Trojan’s intention is misleading the user from its true
objective, in other words, the user is deceived by thinking to be doing one thing but
is activating the trojan program.
1Defective software is not considered malware, due to its non-intentional damage.
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Botnet Cybercriminals breach the security of devices2 connected to the network, taking
control of the infected devices (known as zombies) into a network of bots, which
are remotely managed by them.
Back Doors A mechanism in which a device’s security measures are circumvented in-
conspicuously into gaining access to the system or its data. Sometimes can be
deployed by rootkits, and in other cases, the software manufacturer can leave it for-
gotten while testing, or also as a method for providing the user a way of restoring
his password. Default passwords can be seen as backdoors if not changed.
Exploits Specific software designed to take advantage of a particular vulnerability avail-
able in the target, causing unanticipated behavior on the system.
Other Less Common Adware, Drive by Download, Flooders, Keylogger, Macro Viruses,
Rootkits, Spammers, Spyware.
2.6 Life-cycle
When a product release occurs, it should not be expected to be flawless. Figure 2.2 helps
to understand the life-cycle of a vulnerability in a given product
Having into consideration OWASP’s Testing Guide[52], in the first moment, there is
what is considered to be a residual risk that increases with time because products are not
flawless and it is a matter of time until a vulnerability is found. At this point, there is
somewhat as an exponential increase of the risk.
Until a patch is released to fix this problem the vulnerability will become public, and
the public will do its job of trying to exploit it, maybe out of curiosity, or it could be with
malicious intent. There is a high probability of an exploit for that vulnerability becoming
public in a short period of time.
Meanwhile, the risk slowly starts to be mitigated after malware signatures are made
available, and even more when the patch is released. Afterward, it is a matter of time
until enterprises begin to apply the patch, some may take more time than others, this is
an effect of not knowing how it will affect their systems. Therefore it has to be done with
baby steps.
After some time, the risk decreases as the patch becomes widely known and a system
still vulnerable should be much harder to find.
2.6.1 Patches
As we can infer from the previous section, a patch is a piece of software designed to
amend an existing problem, this includes security vulnerabilities, improving usability,
2Devices that can range from computers to smartphones or IoT devices (Internet of Things).
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Figure 2.2: Vulnerability Life cycle: Window of Exposure
functionalities or performance[62].
Patches are a quick resolution for a problem, and sometimes they are kept until a new
stable software version is released. Although it is meant to repair, as patches are usually
a race against time, it is common for them to introduce new problems[61].
2.6.2 Zero-Day
A Zero-Day vulnerability, according to FireEye [29] and Kaspersky [38], consists in an
existing vulnerability that is unknown to anyone.
The faster the hacker becomes aware of a vulnerability, more likely he will be suc-
cessful in the exploitation. Any attacks that try to take advantage of such weakness, at
that time are known as Zero-Day Attacks or Zero-Day Exploits.
The Zero-Day is a reference for when the interested parties in charge of such software
become aware of the glitch. If these individuals take ten days to discover it, from the
hackers perspective, it would be known as a Ten-Day vulnerability.
2.7 Vulnerabilities Categorization
“...In the first half of 2017, Trend Micro’s Zero Day Initiative discovered and disclosed
382 new vulnerabilities. Zero-days in 2017 increased to 49 from a mere eight the previous
year....” - Trend Micro [48]
Having into consideration the previous citation from Trend Micro, new vulnerabilities
are found at a remarkable pace. Illustration 2.3 shows the number of vulnerabilities found
each year since 19993 until 2017.
3The year of 1999 presents vulnerabilities found until that year.
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Figure 2.3: Number of Vulnerabilities over the years. [21]
It is easy to realize that there might be a problem for interested parties to become
aware of all the publicly disclosed vulnerabilities, and the new ones coming out. To
ease the process of spreading the word and managing all vulnerabilities, the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures was formed.
2.7.1 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
Mann and Christey [40] (1999), from the MITRE Corporation, proposed the creation
of a shareable database of vulnerabilities. Later that year, Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures, CVE, was assembled and 321 vulnerabilities were instantly disclosed4, and
each of these vulnerabilities got associated with a unique CVE identifier5.
While implementing the CVE List, the responsible team had to improvise a way to
group the known vulnerabilities, which evolved into a project of its own called Com-
mon Weakness Enumeration (CWE). CWE’s6 purpose is to categorize vulnerabilities by
classes, and it works similarly to the CVE List. Both CVE and CWE are own by The
MITRE Corporation [63].
2.7.2 Common Vulnerability Scoring System
According to First.org [30], rating vulnerabilities have been a long time challenge, several
systems were tried, but none fit the need. Those systems were confusing due to the use
of different classifications for the same vulnerability amongst different platforms. The
problem was that vendors and stakeholders did not know how to prioritize the threat of
the present vulnerabilities.
4Remember that in 1999 only 321 were known vs. 382 or the first half of 2017.
5One CVE represents a cataloged vulnerability. When cataloged it gets an identifier with the following
format, CVE-YYYY-NNNN, Y stands for the year the vulnerability was classified, and N stands for its
number.
6One CWE represents one type of vulnerability. When classified it gets an identifier with the following
format, CWE-NNN, N stands for its number.
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A universal open standard for scoring vulnerabilities was then designed and is now
responsible for grading vulnerabilities, named as Common Vulnerability Scoring Sys-
tem(CVSS). The CVSS consists of three groups, each of these evaluate specific charac-
teristics that depending on the group may be changed.
Figure 2.4: CVSS Groups, Metrics and Formula
Illustration 2.4 presents the overall formula, and allows the reader to infer all metrics
involved in the calculus of the CVSS, in a more detailed way, it is possible to extract each
group’s metrics and its dependencies.
2.7.3 Base Metric Group
The base group contains properties that are set by the vendor and are immutable, which
means that the result of formula will remain the same throughout time. This group has
into consideration the following aspects:
Access Complexity Difficulty of exploring the vulnerability, after the attacker as already
gain access to the system.
Access Vector Exploited locally or remotely?
Authentication Authentication required for activating the vulnerability?
Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability Impact Information delivery affected?
Chapter 2. Vulnerabilities 16
Impact Bias Allows to assign more weight to one of the CIA properties over the remain-
ing.
While implementing this project, it has only been emphasized this group before the
remaining ones. The reason is because PT has several complex systems that may change
at any given time, making difficult to operate over the remaining metrics groups that might
vary on these conditions, making this group more suitable.
2.7.4 Temporal Metric Group
The temporal group is responsible for metrics throughout the life of a vulnerability. Its
metrics are set by the vendor and are mutable. This group relies on the base group to be
computed, and has into consideration the following aspects:
Exploitability Code or exploits available?
Remediation Level Workarounds or patches provided by the vendor?
Report Confidence Degree of confidence in which the vulnerability is real.
2.7.5 Environmental Metric Group
The environment group measures the effect that a vulnerability might have in its vicinity.
Its metrics are set by the end-users and are mutable. This group depends on the temporal
group for being computed, and has into consideration the following aspects:
Collateral Damage Potential Physical damage or loss possible?
Target Distribution Susceptible surrounding environment where the vulnerability was
exploited?
2.8 Conclusion
Vulnerabilities are the key for this project, and the motive for finding vulnerabilities or
the impact they can have in the system is the base for this master thesis. This chapter tries
to explain what a vulnerability is, also described some concerns related to vulnerabilities,
how they are categorized and more important, prioritized.
The most important thing to retain of this chapter is that a vulnerability is a flaw in the
hardware or software that when exploited compromises data, and if exploited it can cause
irreversible damage to the organization.
Chapter 3
Portugal Telecom’s Vulnerability
Assessment
“Companies spend millions of dollars on firewalls, encryption and secure access devices,
and it’s money wasted, because none of these measures address the weakest link in the
security chain.” - Kevin Mitnick, Security Consultant
“There are only two types of companies: Those that have been hacked and those that
will be hacked.” - Robert S. Mueller III, former FBI Director
In the last chapter, we have seen the basis of this essay, vulnerabilities. We saw what
defines a vulnerability, their lifetime, the impact they might have, how they are scored,
and more.
In this chapter, we will analyze the case of Portugal Telecom regarding the proce-
dures for discovering and managing vulnerabilities. It was problems concerning these
procedures that lead to the development of a custom software named Vulnerability As-
sessment Coordinator (VAC). VAC software aimed for a centralized and automized way
of managing vulnerability scans over Portugal Telecom’s network infrastructure.
In this chapter, we will examine the original problem of Portugal Telecom. Then
we will see what technologies the organization used at the time. Subsequently, we will
get into VAC software in more detail, specifically its architecture, and the purpose of its
main components. Finally, we will get to the pros and cons of VAC, which lead to the
Continuous Security Assessment master thesis.
3.1 DCY’s Lacuna
Continuous Security Assessment thesis is a significant improvement of a previous project
named Vulnerability Assessment Coordinator. VAC was originated in a joint venture
between the Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências and Portugal Telecom, which
resulted in a master thesis.
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The intended solution was a mean to manage vulnerabilities in the most automatized
way possible. This because the process of detection and mitigation of vulnerabilities for
assets exposed to the internet was done manually, and in a nonregular manner.
3.1.1 Vulnerability Scanning
NIST defines the term vulnerability scanning as being what “... identifies hosts and host
attributes ... but it also attempts to identify vulnerabilities rather than relying on human
interpretation of the scanning results.”[51]
Typically, a vulnerability scan is composed of two main phases: Discovery and Scan-
ning. The discovery phase is about making a reconnaissance of the target, in other words,
it is about discovering open ports, identifying services, inferring the operating system,
and so on. The scanning phase compares the responses provided by the target for matches
against known vulnerabilities.
The setup of the scanner technology’s appliances is actively involved with the type
of intelligence we pretend to extract from the vulnerability scans. Two crucial decisions
have to be made regarding a scan. The first is while setting up the scanning appliance,
while the second is when making the scan configuration.
The first decision is about the view of the scanning appliance. When studying the
place where to set the scanner, there two options each with advantages and disadvantages.
External We would get a better understanding of the challenges imposed to an adversary
while trying to get a possible access point. However, the results related to the
asset might not be accurate, due to the possibility of having defense mechanisms
protecting the target, e.g., Firewall, WAF.
Internal A local scan would indeed provide vulnerabilities with a higher percentage of
confidence. However, we would not have the adversaries point of view to access
the system. This perspective is valuable because we should take into consideration
if the weakness is or is not in range of the adversary, e.g., with the use of a firewall,
a higher rank vulnerability could be overcome by another vulnerability less critical.
Concerning the authentication of scans, it should be seen as an improvement on the
confidence level of the reported vulnerabilities. What does this means, both scan types
compare the obtained responses from the target against a vulnerability database for a
match. The difference is while a non-authenticated scan might identify a given service
with a version that is known for being vulnerable, leading to the signaling of that vulner-
ability in the report. The authenticated scan could verify if the asset contained some sort
of patch fixing that vulnerability, meaning that there is no vulnerability.
Another factor is that every scanner engine is different and contain different purposes,
e.g., some are more web-orientated, others more services orientated, and so forth. The
Chapter 3. Portugal Telecom’s Vulnerability Assessment 19
use of a single vulnerability scanner is not full-proof. However, the use of more than one
can increase the odds in our favor.
The problem here is, there are no standard metrics for vendors, despite what we have
seen in the last chapter, vulnerabilities have CVSS managed by a third party, but other
parameters are not. Other parameters considered by vendors have the purpose of helping
customers prioritizing weaknesses, but they have no common ground, e.g., the severity
field that almost every scanner accounts. One scanner might value it from one to five,
while another may value it as low, medium, or high.
Also, most engines are not cloud-based. Fact is most internal scanners have to be man-
aged by customers, and it might require human interaction before a scan to perform oper-
ations like updating the operating system, updating the appliances’ vulnerability database,
and so forth. These factors have to be taken into consideration since it might take much
time to do before launching a scan.
Vulnerability scanners have a feature that is essential to mention, it is called template,
and consists of the guidelines for running the scan to the target. The vulnerability scanners
will only do what is specified in the selected template, e.g., if we want a TCP port scan, it
must be stated in the scanning template.
Figure 3.1: Launch Vulnerability Scan Procedure
Image 3.1 illustrates the launch scan procedure handled by a DCY operator. The
numbers contained in the illustration are ordered by execution, except for steps three and
four that are exemplifying the communication between the scanner and the target. Next,
each number is matched with the correspondent task.
1. Update the server’s OS and appliance’s vulnerability database;
2. Configure the target and schedule the scan;
3. Probes ports and requests are made from the scanner;
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4. Responses provided by the target;
5. Request the vulnerability technology scanner for the generation of the scan report;
6. Vulnerability report provided.
All these tasks result in a significant setback for PT personal.
3.1.2 Vulnerabilities Reporting
Parsing all the information provided by the vulnerability scanning reports can prove to be
a laborious task.
Figure 3.2: Upload Vulnerability Reports Information
The procedure associated with the upload of the scan report results to DCY’s repos-
itories performed by a DCY operator are exemplified in image 3.2. Next, each number
contained in the illustration will now be matched with the correspondent task.
1. The DCY operator analyses the erudition provided by each report1, correlates, and
filters it by “making a new report” with the essential data.
2. With the filtered report, he starts uploading it to all of DCY’s information reposito-
ries.
All the necessary tasks in the previous section plus these ones represent a vital impact
on DCY’s staff that already have much to take their time.
3.2 Technologies in use at 2015/2016
DCY used to work with:
1PT contains more than one scanner technology performing scans to their assets.
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• Vulnerability engines:
– Greenbone Networks’ OpenVAS
– Rapid7’s nexpose
• Information repositories:
– ArcSight ESM
– High-Performance Infrastructure for Data Research (Hidra).
3.2.1 Vulnerability Scanners
Let’s have a look at the vulnerability scanners used by DCY at the time.
OpenVAS Open Vulnerability Assessment System is a Free to Use framework that aims
to provide a full vulnerability management solution. OpenVAS is structured in three
modules. They are named Clients, Services, and Data. [32]
The Clients’ module is responsible for handling clients. It provides two way to
interact, one via Web Service and the other via Shell. The Services’ module, is
where the magic happens, this is the place where the scanner and the manager are
located. The manager is where all the intelligence of the OpenVAS is, it controls
the scanner, and interacts with the Clients’ and Data’s modules. The Data module
contains the Network Vulnerability Tests’ (NVT) and communicates strictly with
the Service module. The NVT’s contain the tests to be executed by the scanner and
updated on a daily basis, it can be updated from a commercial feed service or by
OpenVAS NVT Feed, which is free. The Data’s module also contains a database
where all the pasts results and configurations stay.
One significant advantage of OpenVAS, aside from being free, is the fact that it
could be used in a master-slave config, being the master responsible for updating
the slaves, and also scheduling their tasks in the best possible way.
Nexpose In reverse to OpenVAS, Nexpose is subscription based software. Rapid7 is
Nexpose’s manufacturer and offers two vulnerability scanning solutions. The first
is InsightVM which is a suite with all their tools for vulnerability management, and
secondly, Nexpose which they refer to as being an on-premise vulnerability scanner
solution. [58]
Nexpose being a proprietary software besides from the server is deployed at, is
a self-sustained software, meaning Rapid7 manages its vulnerability database up-
dates.
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A few advantages that Nexpose can count on is that every vulnerability validation is
integrated with Metasploit, another tool belonging to Rapid7, another is that Nex-
pose keeps up with the vulnerabilities found in the systems from the moment it is
detected until the removal, among several others.
The problem with these scanners is that both require workforce from DCY. From the
server’s update to the target management, or the scan scheduling to the report validation,
all these chores take precious time to DCY personal.
3.2.2 Information Systems
The information systems at the disposal of DCY for storing asset’s vulnerabilities at the
time were two:
ArcSight ESM ArcSight ESM is a powerful and efficient SIEM (Security Information
and Event Management) software. INFOSEC Institute describes a SIEM as being
“... a software solution that normalizes, filters, correlates, assembles, and centrally
manages other operational events to monitor, alert on, respond to, analyze, audit,
and manage security and compliance pertinent information. SIEM systems provide
fundamental security operations like other product categories.”[35]
This technology is licensed and was acquired by PT. Like the description stated,
SIEMs correlate information from multiple sources and allow Security Operation
Center (SOC) teams to act more efficiently. In the context of the project, ArcSight
collects information on the targets from the vulnerability scanners.
Hidra Is an in-house development of PT, and it is composed of three software RabbitMQ[55],
ElasticSearch[25], and Kibana[26].
RabbitMQ is an open source message broker, used for its advance message queue-
ing protocol, which allows a reliable change of vast quantities of events.
ElasticSearch is a distributed, RESTful search and analytics engine capable of han-
dling with massive amounts of information. Although the data managed by Elastic-
Search is centrally stored, we can query the data and expect quick results smoothly
with the help of JSON[9].
Kibana is a visualizer for the data stored in ElasticSearch. It allows to graphically
represent the information efficiently and quickly through the use of custom dash-
boards that aggregate, and filter the data stored. Both Kibana and ElasticSearch are
from the same manufacturer[24].
From these components, it is possible to understand that Hidra was aimed to be a
tool for handling a massive quantity of data and allow a rapid visualization of that
intelligence.
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3.3 VAC Architecture
Aswe have seen in the previous sections, vulnerability detection and mitigation are crucial
when to secure the ecosystem of any company, and PT has to spend much time to assure
this. However, DCY has not much time to spend on these tasks, becoming the second
choice against more critical situations. From this insufficiency, the idea for an automatized
vulnerability assessment and management was born.
The Vulnerability Assessment Coordinator is the project that would come to solve
DCY’s demand. It was meant to be a centralized platform where it would be possible to:
• Upload the configuration for new scanner engines2.
• Configure new assets (IPs, IP Ranges, or Hostnames).
• Schedule scans3.
• After the first scan4, it would be possible to flag vulnerability events as exceptions,
which meant that from that time forward it would be regarded as a false positive.
Image 3.3 illustrates VAC’s principal components, and how they interact with the
vulnerability engines and the information repositories.
Figure 3.3: VAC Architecture
After looking at the previous image, we can, without doubt, see four specific modules,
let’s now have a closer look at each one and analyze how they interact with its vicinity in
a more detailed manner.
2However, the only technology supported was the ones that PT possessed at that time.
3The results of the scans would be automatically uploaded to the data repositories.
4The term First Scan refers to the first time an asset is scanned through the use of VAC, and not VAC’s
first scan ever.
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3.3.1 Scheduler Module
The scheduler module is responsible for keeping every scan configuration, and it uses an
internal object named scan to interact with other modules. The scan object was designed
to have two subtypes, which are:
Spontaneous Scan Is a scan that only has one occurrence. Also, it is to occur as soon as
possible and provides the user the power to select what scanner engine to perform
the scan.
Periodic Scan Is a scan that has a frequency property associated, which makes it useful
for launching a scan at a specific date and time, e.g., when it causes less disruption
to the asset delivering service.
Now that we have seen the types of scan, let’s analyze de scan object. The scan object
per se is not only where all the information related to the targeted assets is stored, but also
where the scan configuration is kept. When the operator is defining the object, he sets the
following properties:
ID Scan Identifier
Template VAC template5 name, this represents the guidelines for the scanning itself.
Hosts The assets to be scanned, as mentioned previously, this could be IPs, IP Ranges,
or Hostnames.
Start The date and time for the scan to be executed.
Available Period This is a concept for the scan to be paused or resumed if a specific time
is reached, e.g., we pretend that a scan does not disturb the regular working hours
of a targeted asset, so the available period to start could be from 8 pm until 6 am.
Options This is a key-value dictionary. Besides others values, this is where is stated the
criticalness of the scan.
Scanner6 Is a property that allows the operator to choose what scanner engine technology
to be used while scanning the target.
Frequency7 Is a property that can range from: Once, Daily, Weekly, or Monthly. It
allows to schedule a scan to occur at a time in a periodical manner.
In the periodic scan type, the scanner technology is selected according to the criticality
option. If defined and equal or higher to seven, then the primary scanner8 is selected.
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Figure 3.4: Scheduler Module Steps
Illustration 3.4 helps to understand the steps of the scheduler module, and an explana-
tion of what it has been done is provided after.
So as said before, the scheduler module maintains every scan configuration in its
possession. At its core, there are two central properties, a timer and a concept of a primary
scanner technology.
The purpose of the timer is for checking if any scan has to be executed. If this is
the case, the scan configuration is sent to the scanner manager module to perform the
scan, and the timer is reset. As to the primary scanner attribute, DCY between OpenVAS
and Nexpose, saw it fit to assign Nexpose more significant tasks, becoming Nexpose
responsible for scanning more critical assets, due to more reliable results. What this tries
to achieve is a means for maximizing the scanner appliances’ effectiveness, which is done
by assigning scans of less critical assets to the not primary scanners, and scanning the
truly critical assets with the primary scanners.
3.3.2 Scanner Manager Module
In a similar way to what was done in the previous section, we will first address the objects
that the Scanner Manager module interacts with, and from that, move onto the scanner
manager analysis per se.
5VAC Template is an object from the Scanner Manager Module, and will be addressed ahead.
8The primary scanner is a property of the Scheduler Module, and will be addressed ahead.
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This module interacts with two objects besides the scan object, which names are scan-
ner and VAC template.
The scanner object represents one instance of a scanner engine technology, through
the retention of information regarding that instance. Its attributes are:
ID The scanner instance identifier to VAC.
Host The address where this scanner is located can be an IP or Hostname.
Scanner Type Scanner Engine Technology, which is for this instance to represent. Only
can be OpenVAS or Nexpose.
Credentials The username & password for VAC to log into the scanner appliance in-
stance.
Configurations This is a key-value dictionary. It is possible for VAC to define some
extra configurations, e.g., the maximum number of scans that can be happening at
the same time, among others.
The Scanner Manager Module is able to establish a connection with the scanning
appliances through the use of application programming interface (API) made available
by the vendors. When the connection is active, and the scanner manager authenticates
successfully, it can perform operations on the appliance.
In the last section we saw that when defining a scan object, one of its properties
was a template. This property identifies which VAC Template object is selected when
preparing the scan. The VAC template object is a mere association between all equivalent
vulnerability engine’s templates and VAC. The following example will try to help to make
it more clear, e.g., imagine in each scanner technology a template that will only perform
a scan to TCP ports, so we take each template’s name from each scanner technology and
create a VAC Template with the templates’ names there. When defining the Template in
VAC, we face the following properties:
ID The template identifier to VAC.
Scanner Templates It can be seen as a key-value dictionary, where the key would be the
type of scanner technology, and the value would match to the name of the template
for that same technology.
The scan object is also associated with the Scanner Manager module, which interac-
tion starts at the Scheduler Module. When the scan information switches to this module’s
possession, it sees its responsibilities grow as it makes part of this module to supervise
every scan occurring.
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Figure 3.5: Scanner Manager Module Steps
Figure 3.5 is trying to illustrate that after the scheduler module asks for a scan launch,
the scanner manager module will become responsible for the scan. Similarly to the last
module, this module also has in its properties a timer. The timer’s purpose is to periodi-
cally trigger the Scanner Manager module’s routine of verifying new scans to launch and
to monitor the active scans. When a scan changes its state, this module will forward it
to the accountable module. The “turn” ends when the Scanner Manager module finishes
checking all scans at its possession, at that time the timer is reset.
3.3.3 Results Manager Module
The Results Manager module interacts with two other objects besides the scan object,
whom names are processor and exception.
The processor object will handle a given scanning technology report. Every scan re-
port issued contains a specific structure depending on the issuing scanning technology.
In a nutshell, VAC will have to contain as many processor classes as there are scanning
technologies9. The processor objects will be the ones capable of handling the scanning
technologies reports because they are the ones knowing the scanning technology report’s
structure. Also, they contain every DCY’s information repository’s connector within it-
self, in order to connect and upload the results to the DCY’s repositories.
Image 3.6 tries to ease the understanding of the Results Manager module by present-
ing how it is processed. The scanning technology’s reports will be the input of the corre-
sponding scanning technology processor, and then the processor will handle the reports,
and diffuse the results by the DCY’s repositories.
9Which ultimately will only exist two, one for OpenVAS and the other for Nexpose.
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Figure 3.6: Scheduler Module Steps
The other object that interacts with the Results Manager module is the exception ob-
ject. After a scan occurrence, the results are uploaded to the information repositories of
DCY. At this point, the DCY operator will perform an analysis of the results obtained,
and if the existence of a false positive is verified, then that particular event will have to
be excepted from future scans, this is done through the use of an exception object. This
object is composed of the following attributes:
Vulnerability Name The vulnerability name in the scanning technology.
Host he host where the vulnerability event was signaled.
Port Protocol The vulnerable protocol.
Port Number The vulnerable port.
Scanner Type The scanning technology name that signaled the vulnerability.
Person The person who vouched for the exception.
Reason Motive why it is to except.
Result This field is a copy of the result field that makes part of the vulnerability classifi-
cation in the scanning technology.
When a scan finishes executing, and this module executes its procedure by comparing
every vulnerability event against its exception records. If a match is found, then the
vulnerability event would not be uploaded to the DCY’s information repositories.
The Results Manager module will hold on to every scanning technology processor
and every existing exception.
Image 3.7 illustrates the regular procedure of the Results Manager module10. Simi-
larly to the previous modules, it makes use of a timer, but it also has a repository in the
server where the solution is deployed. The timer attribute in resemblance to the other
modules, allows this module to check if finished scans were received. Afterward, it will
10Being the Scanner Manager module (SMM) responsible for all interactions with the scanning appli-
ances, the SMM API represents the pointer that the Results Manager module contains for being able to
request services to the scanning technologies.
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Figure 3.7: Results Module Steps
request their reports, monitor its status, and download the report when it finishes. Then it
will send it to the responsible technology processor.
The other attribute is a repository, which purpose is mainly for logging. When the
processors finish the handle and upload of the results into the DCY’s repositories execut-
ing, it creates an empty file related to then scan that got processed. This feature allows
the DCY operator, to check if an error occurred due to the presence or not of the file.
3.3.4 Interface Module
Last but not least, we now are going to have a walkthrough over the Interface Module.
This module is responsible for handling the view layer of the VAC project. It is what
allows the DCY operator to communicate with VAC itself. VAC can be only operated
through the use of this module.
In figure 3.3, it was represented interactions coming and going from this module, the
ones starting on this modules are mainly setter operations, while the communications
ending on this module are getter operations.
Image 3.8 shows the first page when accessing VAC. This page will show scans oc-
curring at the time we access the VAC website. Due to the size of the images, other
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Figure 3.8: Welcome Page
views from VAC will be available in Appendix A section. However, it will be provided
descriptions of those same views ahead, and what we can accomplish with them.11
A.1 - Scheduler View On this screen, it is possible for the user to check all periodic scans
configured, he can also remove them. As to the spontaneous scans, it has the same
behavior, however, when a spontaneous scan finishes it is automatically removed
from the list.
A.2 - Scheduler Configuration’s Properties On this screen, it is possible to watch the
current values of the attributes referred at the end of section 3.3.1 Scheduler Mod-
ule, and also to change them.
A.3 - Configure New Periodic Scan12 On this screen, it is possible to configure a new
periodic scan through the fulfillment of the attributes of a scan referenced in section
3.3.1 Scheduler Module.
A.4 - Scanner View On this screen, it is possible to check the current scanner appliances
for each scanning vulnerability technology, the operator can also remove them.13
A.5 - Add Scanner Configuration On this screen, the operator can add a new scanner
11All the views retracted are related to the previous modules. They will present how the operator can
interact with VAC, while also trying to ease the understanding of the previous sections.
13The Scanner Configuration’s Properties view is not shown because it is equal to the Scheduler Config-
uration’s Properties but only contains the timer box.
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appliance through the fulfillment of the attributes of a scanner object referenced in
section 3.3.2 Scanner Management Module.
A.6 - Template View (Expanded) On this screen, it is possible to check the current tem-
plates14, the operator can also remove them.
A.7 - Configure New Template On this screen, the operator can create a new VAC Tem-
plate object. Note that the “Scanner Type” field takes the scanning technology
name, and when the “New Configuration” button is pressed, a text form pops up
and allows the insertion of the template name that matches that scanning technol-
ogy.
A.8 - Processor View On this screen, the operator can see the processors that are cur-
rently working, and he can also remove them.15 The processor is one of the objects
described in section 3.3.3. Results Manager Module.
A.9 - Results Manager Configuration’s Properties On this screen, besides the timer
box it is possible to observe that the operator can decide where the results repository
will be. The repository is what was referenced in section 3.3.3. Results Manager
Module, as being useful for logging operations.
A.10 - Exception View (Expanded) On this screen, it is possible to get the list of current
exceptions and their information to the target asset. The operator can also remove
them at any time.
A.11 - Configure New Exception On this screen, it is possible to configure a new ex-
ception by fulfilling the fields as they were in the report.
3.4 VAC - Pros & Cons
The original objectives for VAC were:
1. Automatical scan configuration across the available scanning technologies.
2. Automatical periodical scan to PT’s infrastructure.
3. Automatical upload of the results to DCY’s information repositories.
These objectives were achieved, and the development of the solution came to facili-
tate the work of DCY’s personal. It allowed them to cease doing repetitive chores like
the scheduling of scans on the scanner’s appliances scattered along PT’s ecosystem, or
14This was referenced in section 3.3.3. Results Manager Module as the VAC Template object.
15The Add Processor view is not shown because it only presents a text form to insert the name of the
processor class.
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the manual process of verifying the scan reports or uploading the information into the
repositories.
However, due to time limitations, VAC was like a “Diamond in the rough”, being a
tool with tremendous potential but also demanding the operator to know how the software
runs. VACwas also restricted due to some limitations of the scanning technologies, but the
primary factor was that VAC was not designed to be scalable regarding any technologies,
in other words, VAC could not be expanded to work with any other technology without a
significant development.
Concerning the technology deficiencies, VAC will only be able to perform vulnera-
bility scans, which identify and detect vulnerabilities related to flawed software or mis-
configured assets. Also, taking into consideration that Nexpose’s scan reports are more
empowered information wise, VAC was designed to convert OpenVAS’ scan reports to
the format of Nexpose’s reports structure, becoming the canonical format for the upload
of the results to the repositories.
Another topic is precisely the information repositories, which the operator has no
control over them. PT contains clients whom may have bought a suite of services, and
vulnerability scanning may be a part of this suite. With VAC, the upload of the results to
the repositories is automatical, and in this case, it is unwanted behavior. Another factor
is, there are only two technologies available with no possible way to expand or remove
them.
3.5 Conclusion
PT was facing a concern that consisted of having to spend much time with vulnerability
scanning related tasks, which most times had to be set aside given the duration of such
tasks and the appearance of more urging matters. Having this problem in hands, it was
drawn the guidelines for an automatical system for vulnerability scanning.
A partnership between PT and FCUL lead to a master thesis regarding the previous
problem. The Vulnerability Assessment Coordinator was the outcome of this collabora-
tion. The project aimed for a reduction of tasks related to vulnerability scanning by DCY’s
personnel, through the automation of periodical vulnerability scans over PT’s assets and
the upload of the scan’s results into DCY’s information repositories.
DCY’s tasks were reduced to the maintenance of the servers where the vulnerability
scanners were deployed in, and the post-processing of the information uploaded to the
repositories. However, VAC got stuck to the technologies PT had at the time, becoming a
non-scalable system.
Chapter 4
The Project of Continuous Security
Assessment
“As we’ve come to realize, the idea that security starts and ends with the purchase of a
prepackaged firewall is simply misguided.” - Art Wittmann, Freelance journalist and writ-
ter specialiazed in IT.
“In the very near future, cyber security exercises are going to be absolutely expected
of all companies by regulators.” - Michael A. Vatis, partner in the New York office of
Steptoe.
In the last chapter, we witnessed how PT tried to counteract the vulnerability assess-
ment procedures, which was already a tremendous time-consuming task even if concern-
ing critical assets only. The solution was the creation of a software, VAC, which purpose
was to reduce the human interaction on the vulnerability assessment to a minimum. The
procedures that kept requiring intervention were operations like, e.g., maintenance of the
servers where the vulnerability scanners were deployed, or the analysis of the results up-
loaded into the DCY’s information repositories.
This chapter will present the limitations of VAC, which lead to the guidelines that
were behind VACv2. It will also describe what was intended for VACv2 to accomplish.
Last, it will analyze the original planning of this master thesis and compare it to the real
schedule with the reasons that cause the project to drift.
This chapter will first present VAC limitations and the VACv2 main objectives. At
this point, we will get into more detail of each objective to understand what is pretended
from each one. The following section will be presenting the original planning vs. the real
planning with the causes why the original deadline drifted.
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4.1 The Objective of the Project
The name of this project was not randomly chosen, and it is intended that at the end of
this project a system is built which will continuously perform security assessments of
PT’s platforms.
VAC was unable to achieve its purpose mainly for two reasons, first was the difficulty
in using the software. However, with time this could have been overcome, the problem
was that VAC got short on time due to PT ceasing its contract with Rapid7 regarding
Nexpose, and started to use Qualys cloud-based vulnerability scanner which VAC was
not able to integrate, and so a need for a VACv2 was born.
To perform vulnerability assessments continuously while trying to make it more au-
tonomous is the ultimate goal of this project. To achieve this end, and to avoid losing the
effort spent in VAC, the objectives for VACv2 were outlined:
Improvement of VAC Overall enhancement of the tool, making its scalable regarding
technologies, improving usability, and protecting its data from unwanted access;
Addition of a new Scanning Technology into VACv2 addition of the new scanning tech-
nology, Qualys, and meeting its requirements;
Results treating & Data correlation - Improving the results manager module and pro-
viding control to the operator.
Let’s now approach what is intended from each objective presented above.
4.1.1 Improvement of VAC
VAC was originated from a master thesis. Nonetheless, it was a project with effort and
costs associated, and PT did not saw it lightly just to set it aside due to its emerging
limitations. The first objective defined for this thesis was the improvement of VAC, which
lead to the development of a new version, hence the name VACv2.
By the time this thesis started, DCY already had assessed the tool for its deficiencies
and possible improvements. These requirements are stated ahead, and afterward, they will
be approached in further detail.
• Automatical Target Identification
• Authentication of Users
• Authorized Users (Whitelisting)
• Cipher Sensitive Data
• Cookie-based Session
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• Correlation Data Integrators1
• Creation and Management of Mailing Lists
• Data Pre-Load
• Editable Configuration Files
• Improvement of Data Management (Creation, Update, and Removal)
• Improvement of Logging
• Improvement of Scan Recurrence
• Notifications & Custom Mailing
• Technology Loading
These requirements will provide changes both in server side as the client side of the
solution. While developing the solution the student was allowed to add any new features
that could improve the software.
Let’s now analyze what is pretended from each of these requirements.
Automatical Target Identification
This was a highly requested feature by PT, and perhaps, the most influential feature in
VACv2 because of the changes it requires over the code of the scanner appliances and the
scan configuration.
For this feature to be accomplished, it requires that the solution to be aware of what
network an appliance is responsible for scanning. It is intended to VACv2 to automatically
assign the correspondent appliances to the targets while the operator is making the scan
configuration.
In the end, this feature would try to map a given target with the correspondent network/
appliance autonomously.
Authentication of Users
The data handled by the solution is sensitive, not only because it handles confirmed vul-
nerabilities, but also because those vulnerabilities were reported in high-valued assets
belonging to PT. VAC had no authentication, meaning that anyone could reach this infor-
mation, becoming itself a liability.
This mechanism is intended to work with resort to Active Directory Kerberos authen-
tication, meaning that users credentials will have to be exchanged with the server. To
1This feature fits into two objectives: Improvement of VAC; and Results Treating & Data Correlation
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securely exchange credentials with VACv2, it means that the communication between the
client and server has to be secure through the use of a certificate generated by PT.
In the end, it is supposed that this feature adds a secure communication between the
client and server, and Active Directory Kerberos Authentication of the user, making sure
only PT personal will access the information.
Authorized Users (Whitelisting)
This feature aims to restrict access to VACv2, meaning that only authorized users would
be able to access the solution. This feature will work based on a whitelisting technique
for users.
In the end, this feature combined with the Authentication of Users presented previ-
ously will guarantee that only the necessary PT’s personal identified in the whitelist will
gain access to VACv2.
Cipher Sensitive Data
We have already witnessed the addition of two security layers over the solution. However,
these measures would only apply to users trying to access the client-side of VACv2. An
example of data that VACv2 needs to store is when configuring a new scanner appliance,
the credentials for accessing such appliance must be stored by the software.
This last example tries to make aware that is not only the communication client-server
or the access to the solution that needs security, but also the back-end information. All the
information stored on the server that is considered sensitive must be protected, and this is
done with resort to ciphers.
However, another feature that will be mentioned ahead is the possibility of having
editable configuration files, this means that only data like credentials and such properties
will be ciphered.
Cookie-based Session
This feature aims to associate a user with a session. The session will be assigned to a
user after a successful authentication into the platform and will change periodically. The
periodical change of the cookie will try to guarantee that the session is not hijacked.
This feature combined with the Authentication of Users &Authorized Users (Whitelist-
ing) will provide a more comfortable security layer over VACv2.
Correlation Data Integrators
In VAC, it was not convenient to launch scans targeting clients because their results would
be automatically uploaded into DCY’s Information Repositories, which is supposed to
maintain only PT’s data.
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This feature’s objective is to provide the operator whether if it is to upload the data
to an internal Information Repository, and in that case which one of them, being also
possible to choose none or all of them.
In the end, VACv2 will allow the operator to choose what to do with the scan results.
Creation and Management of Mailing Lists
VAC already handled emails. However, this feature was not the most user-friendly. The
operator needed to have an in-depth knowledge of how the software to use this feature
and would need to specify the emails to notify in every scan configuration.
This feature aims to provide a way for the operator to create and manage mailing
lists which will contain emails to be notified regarding an action. In the end, this feature
will allow the operator to specify a mailing list to notify and what should trigger the
notification, e.g., starting or ending of a scan.
Data Pre-Load
This feature is easier to explain with resort to an example. Let’s recollect the configura-
tion of VAC concerning templates, where the operator had to configure every one of the
templates he wanted to use. This is not very practical or user-friendly.
What this feature aims to achieve is the loading of the available information into every
property on the client-side, every property where this feature makes sense. For example,
when the user is configuring a new scan, VACv2 should automatically fetch all the avail-
able templates regardless of the scanning technology.
Editable Configuration Files
DCY’s cybersecurity engineering team, which is the team responsible for handling this
tool had a specific request. They pointed out that in some cases VACv2 might be easier to
handle through the use of editable files than the interface of the application per se.
They requested for the configuration files to become editable in VACv2, something
that did not occur in VAC.
Improvement of Data Management (Creation, Update, and Removal)
VAC could not handle mistakes, the way the operator had to solve them was through the
removal and configuration of a new object.
This feature’s purpose is to make every configuration in VACv2 ready for editing,
avoiding to give the operator more work than is needed, e.g., there are scans which targets
could reach hundreds, and if a mistake were made in these configurations, it should be
possible to edit vs. having to create a new object.
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Improvement of Logging
VAC as any other software, already provided logging. However, it was somewhat generic,
not helping when a problem occurred. Also, VAC store big log files which could be
confusing and information valueless.
It is intended for VACv2 to provide more detailed and intuitive logging, renew on a
daily basis.
Improvement of Scan Recurrence
VAC already handles scan recurrence. However, the new scanning technology requires it
to become more generic. The way VAC handled recurrence was allowing the operator to
set a value between daily, weekly or monthly, which had a few restrictions, e.g.:
• For daily scans, would run every day at the same time.
• For weekly scans, would run accordingly to the day chosen, which means that if the
scan was meant to start at the tenth of the month, and the tenth day was a Monday,
then every recurrence of that scan instance would run on a Monday.
• For monthly scans, continuing with the example provided for the weekly scan, every
month scan would run on the tenth of each month.
However, the new technology provides more power concerning the options available,
e.g., it is possible to run scans every third Thursday of a month. In the end, VACv2 is
intended to support this feature from the new scanning technology acquired by PT.
In the end, VACv2 is intended to work in a similar manner, but in a way that supports
the last technology acquired by PT.
Notifications & Custom Mailing
It is intended that VACv2 allow the operator to choose what should trigger a notification,
but also to provide control over the text contained in the notifications to be sent.
In VACv2, the operator will be able to choose which action will trigger the notification
between starting a scan, ending, or both, while also being able to customize the fields of
the notifications between the title, message or both.
Technology Loading
When VAC was developed, it was designed only to handle two scanning technologies as
seen before. This requirement is essential because not only PT acquired another scanning
technology, but also because VAC got immediately eclipsed.
This requirement aims to not only making VACv2 agnostic to the technology but
also giving to it the power to recognize new technologies without needing a significant
development or even having to restart the software.
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Other Features
Over the next chapters, the reader might be able to notice other features not referenced
at this point. This is because the student made additional features over VACv2 with the
objective of improving the tool’s usability, user-friendliness, amongst others. Some ex-
amples of these additional features can be:
• Dashboard which allows one quick visualization of the active scans, and also past
scans.
• Development and Production environments.
• Activating a debug mode at any time to enrich logs when trying to find a problem.
• Possibility to observe the appliances statuses.
• Possibility to pause/ resume the appliances.
4.1.2 Adding a new Scanning Technology into VACv2
Among a few other issues, one that immediately stood out was the introduction of a new
scanning technology, which VACwas not able to handle. However, after the first objective
of this project, VACv2 Improvement of VAC, already make easier the introduction of new
scanning technologies into the solution.
Qualys Cloud-Based is the scanning technology to be added into VACv2 and will be
described in further detail next. The introduction of this technology will also be useful as
a guide for future scanning technologies to be added.
Qualys Cloud-Based
“Delivered as a Public or Private Cloud, Qualys helps businesses streamline their secu-
rity and compliance solutions and build security into their digital transformation initia-
tives – for greater agility, better business outcomes, and substantial cost savings.” [57]
Qualys is a vulnerability engine technology specialized in providing Security As A
Service (SecAAS), it is a sophisticated platform that offers multiple services over the
cloud, its software suite is illustrated in figure 4.1. The highlighted modules are the ones
who will take part in this master thesis.
Concerning OpenVAS and Nexpose, Qualys being a cloud-based solution in which
no effort is required from the DCY’s personal, it will relieve them from the usual chores
associated with the maintenance of the server.
Next lays some of the advantages which influenced PT when acquiring Qualys’ ser-
vices.
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Figure 4.1: Qualys Modules
Cloud-Based This feature is attractive to PT because it allows DCY’s personal to disen-
gage from activities like the maintenance of the internal scanner appliances. Besides
this feature, it also provides another visibility of the assessments that until this point
PT did not have, through the use of external and internal scanning appliances. In
this case, the external scanner is the one providing the additional visibility. Another
advantage is the service being provided through the cloud, meaning that the oper-
ator is able to access the platform wherever he might be and at any given point in
time.
Vulnerability Management This module is responsible for performing infrastructure’s
scans. It works similarly to Nexpose and OpenVAS. However, contains a few differ-
ences in relation to the other scanning technologies given its cloud-based character.
Web Application Scanning (WAS) This Qualys’ module is responsible for performing
scans over web applications. A WAS scan will find vulnerabilities in a website. In
this type of scanning, authentication is crucial because much sites provide different
views according to the user permissions. WAS is an entirely new scan type to add
to VACv2.
VAC was designed to perform only VM scans and to work with in-premises scanners
without the concept of having networks assigned to appliances.
VACv2’s appliances scanning types will have to contemplate not only what was al-
ready mentioned but also will have to associated appliances to networks, in order to func-
tion correctly with Qualys. This because PT’s internal network is subdivided and Qualys
will operate with an appliance by subnetwork plus an external appliance. Meaning that the
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method that VAC used to use when assigning a scan to an appliance, which consisted in
assigning the scan to the most available appliance, with the insertion of the new scanning
technology will not work because Qualys manages its appliances.
4.1.3 Results treating & Data correlation
VAC’s Results module was developed in a way which the operator had no control what-
soever over it. At the end of every scan, the results would automatically be uploaded into
every DCY’s Information Repository. This is an unwanted behavior for VACv2.
VACv2 will have a redesigned Result’s module. One that empowers the operator to
manage the actual information repositories, while also allowing the operator to choose
where the results are to be upload from the available information repositories.
This section represents the last objective of the Continuous Security Assessment project.
It is intended that at the end of this objective, VACv2 provides power to the operator for
uploading the scans’ results into platforms at his choice. It is also intended VACv2’s Re-
sults Manager module to become unattached from any technologies. In a nutshell, it is
expected that this module behaves similarly to the scanners Module. Furthermore, a new
technology is to be added beyond the two that already exist, AlienVault USM[13].
However, this objective might be seen as a two-step implementation, because it is
supposed that VACv2 uploads the results into Hidra. From the results available in this
platform, a data correlation software - Maltego - will be able to fetch them. Maltego will
have to suffer a specific development for it to be able to fetch the results from Hidra and
correlate the data correctly.
Let’s get to know more of these new technologies.
AlienVault USM
AlienVault Unified Security Management (USM) is a SIEM, VAC already handled an-
other SIEM, ArcSight. However, the way VACv2 will establish a connection to Alien-
Vault is entirely different from the way VACv2 work with ArcSight.2
Paterva’s Maltego
Maltego is a powerful tool that provides a visual layer of data correlated in the form of
a graph. This software is highly used by people belonging to the information security
sector, and it is used by both criminals as law enforcement agencies. This software was
released in 2007 and already makes part of Kali Linux OS software suite.
The initial intent for this project was to connect Maltego and VACv2, in a way that the
need for interaction would be reduced to a minimum. Maltego was intended to start the
interaction with VACv2 by sending the targets to VACv2. Which would then handle the
2The connection between VACv2 and ArcSight was not altered from what was already done by VAC.
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scanning process, and after the scan ended, it would provide the results back to Maltego.
The reason why this intent was not achieved will be approached ahead.
Maltego can have data inserted manually, or it can fetch data through the use of Trans-
forms or Machines. A Transform is a function which purpose is to make a linkage be-
tween the output of such function and the entity which served as input. In other words, a
transform will only return data related to the input entity. Image 4.2 illustrates Maltego’s
environment with the Transforms available for an IPv4 Address entity. A machine is
no more than a set of Transforms.
Figure 4.2: Maltego Environment
4.2 Planning
Since day one of the internship until VACv2 entering its development phase, it was al-
most four months. These four months were spent learning to work with the scanning
technologies; VAC; and Maltego.
Learning how these technologies operate played a critical piece in the development of
VACv2. The original planning was the following:
• Study and Investigation of the Technologies (8 weeks)
• Initial development version (7 weeks)
• Evaluate scalability and efficiency of the development (1 weeks)
• Identification and Implementation of improvement points (8 weeks)
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• Re-evaluation of scalability and effectiveness of the development (8 weeks)
• Elaboration of the Final Report (4 weeks)
The schedule was not successfully followed, and the final solution proved to be some-
what ambitious to a regular program for a master thesis. The next point represents the real
calendar as it occurred:
• Study and Investigation of the Technologies (8 weeks)
• Preliminary Report (6 weeks)
• Improvement over VAC structure (5 weeks)
• Evaluation and testing of VACv2 initial structure (1 week)
• Implementation of improvement points (2 weeks)
• Design and development of the Scanning VM module (5 weeks)
• Evaluation and testing of VACv2 Scanning VM structure (1 week)
• Implementation of improvement points (2 weeks)
• Design and development of the Scanning WAS module (5 weeks)
• Evaluation and testing of VACv2 Scanning WAS structure (1 week)
• Implementation of improvement points (2 weeks)
• Design and development of the Report module (5 weeks)
• Evaluation and testing of VACv2 Report structure (1 week)
• Implementation of improvement points (2 weeks)
• Study and Investigation of data to send to Maltego (1 week)
• Design and development of the Report module (3 weeks)
• Evaluation and testing of VACv2 Report structure (1 week)
• Implementation of improvement points (1 weeks)
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As it is possible to watch, the original deadlines for the project drifted quite a bit. The
reason why this occurred will be explained in the next few paragraphs.
The study and investigation of the scanning technologies, information repositories,
Maltego and VAC run without any drifts, but please keep in mind that this step only
concerned knowing how to interact with these technologies, and it was not about obtaining
an in-depth knowledge of them. It was thanks to this step that was noticed that some of
the original objectives had to be altered, specifically the original intent between Maltego
and VACv2.
In the beginning, DCY intended to add another module to VACv2, also provided by
Qualys, which was the Continuous Monitoring module3. However, after some investiga-
tion, it was made aware that this module would not work as intended, due to not meeting
the expectations of PT. The consequence was the removal of this module from the objec-
tives of this project.
One factor that could also have contributed to the drift of the schedule was the under-
standing and assimilation of this thesis, which passed into the writing of the preliminary
report. It was something that proved to be not so easy given all the technologies that were
included, and their objective.
The remaining steps of the plan could be seen as multiple iterations of three steps
each, these correspond to the steps two to five of the original planning and represent the
biggest drift for this project. It was because of numerous reasons which will be stated
ahead.
Ruby and Sinatra
VAC Software was developed in Ruby with resort to Sinatra Framework. Both the pro-
gramming language and the framework matter because the student did not know anything
about them, having to spend more time to learn the language before and along the project
development.
VAC Procedural Methodology
VAC used a procedural methodology, and this approach the solution passes by breaking
the problem into smaller problems, and making functions which will solve the smaller
problem, and so on.
It is the sum of every function that will make the program as a whole. This approach
does not make more accessible to learn the program.
3This module is focused in providing alerts in real time about modifications in the network. It is available
at https://www.qualys.com/apps/continuous-monitoring/
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Kerberos
Kerberos is offered and handled by an external ruby library. However, the problem lied in
integrating it with VAC.
After some unsuccessful attempts, the student found a way to make this feature work,
but it was one of the most time-consuming features in the project.
Qualys
Qualys does not offer a ruby library to operate over the API, and no external library
was found. The alternative was developing one from scratch to integrate it with VACv2
meeting all the requirements. This custom library was one of the most time-consuming
tasks done in the project, but it was also the core of the project. This library only provided
access to the modules acquired by PT and necessary to the project.
Qualys and ArchSight
Qualys and ArcSight are both proprietary software but provided by different manufactur-
ers. Despite this fact, ArcSight provides what its vendors named connectors. A connector
will establish a connection with another technology, and retrieve useful information back
to ArcSight. In this case, the ArcSight connector will connect to Qualys, and download
the scan reports available in the scanning platform.
ArcSight offered a connector for Rapid7’s Nexpose, but it was concluded that Nex-
pose’s and Qualys’ connectors were utterly different. There were two problems with the
ArcSight-Qualys connector. The first was because it removes VACv2 from the equation,
not allowing post-processing of the data - done by VACv2 - before uploading it into the
ArcSight platform. The second reason is that it will upload the results os every scan con-
tained in the Qualys platform, which is also used to perform scans over PT’s clients, and
therefore not all scan results are wanted in the DCY’s information repositories.
Maltego and Python
The original vision of the project was of a self-sustained system, which would update
itself continuously. Maltego is a software with a different context from the others handled
by this thesis, and so time had to be spent understanding how it operates.
The discovery that Maltego would not be able to work with VACv2 was made at
an early stage of the project, while still learning how to operate with the technology.
The obstacle was that Mlatego does not offer an API, and is not is not ready to receive
requests from other software, as it was intended. The problem would be when VACv2
tried to transmit the results back to Maltego.
Also, when studying the software, it was noticed that Maltego did not offer any sup-
port for Ruby, meaning that an alternate programming language had to be chosen. One
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supported by the technology was Python, and it was also discovered the existence of a
specific Framework - the Canari Framework -, for this programming language, which
could be used to develop Maltego’s transforms. All these circumstances translate into
more time spent learning the language and the framework.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, it was possible to see the objectives that the Continuous Security Assess-
ment project was based. The primary intentions were to improve the original software -
VAC -, to extend its capabilities, and handling & diffusing the results through DCY’s data
repositories. All these objectives would lead to a new version of the software and a new
name - VACv2.
The following section described the motives why this project drifted from the orig-
inal planning. Multiple reasons were provided, but this student believes that the most
important ones might have been learning both languages, Ruby and Python.
Despite this, it is also the belief of the student that given the complexity and size of
the project, he finds the real-time schedule reasonable.
Chapter 5
VACv2 Design & Implementation
“To competently perform rectifying security service, two critical incident response ele-
ments are necessary: information and organization.” - Robert E. Davis, IT Auditor.
“Computer security can simply be protecting your equipment and files from disgruntled
employees, spies, and anything that goes bump in the night, but there is much more.
Computer security helps ensure that your computers, networks, and peripherals work as
expected all the time, and that your data is safe in the event of hard disk crash or a power
failure resulting from an electrical storm. Computer security also makes sure no damage
is done to your data and that no one is able to read it unless you want them to.” - Bruce
Schneier, Security Expert.
In the last chapter, it was shown the directives of this project, and more specifically
of VACv2 development. The restructure would bring back VAC to good use by DCY’s
operators in the second version of the software. It would allow them to lower their effort in
a much labor-intensive assignment, through a significant improvement of the tool, while
also making simpler to interact with it. Also, detaching any technologies from VACv2,
allowing it to operate with any other technology that might come in the future.
In this chapter, we will get into VACv2’s designing and development phases. Please
keep in mind that this new solution is based on existing software, so there might be ref-
erences to how the first software was implemented and works, in order for the reader to
understand the work achieved with this thesis.
This chapter is divided into two sections, the first section is focused on VACv2’s ar-
chitecture and its main modules, which will also be analyzed and described. The second
section is about the development of the tool, and it is composed of three parts symbol-
izing the three objectives of this project. Inside each part, there is a description of the
development made to each module which got affected by such objective.
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5.1 VACv2 Architecture
The VACv2 architecture is based on a crucial circumstance, the difficulty associated with
understanding the original VAC solution. The chosen methodology to be applied in
VACv2 was the modular programming, this is a technique that tries to divide the pro-
gram functionalities into independent modules, meaning each module is self-sustain and
capable of executing all the tasks that fit into their purpose.
Figure 5.1: VACv2 Main Modules Associations
Image 5.1 exemplifies VACv2’s structure. In the next subchapters, every module rep-
resented in the illustration will be analyzed ahead, more specifically, it will be described
the module’s purpose and its associations to other modules.
5.1.1 View Manager Module
This module’s responsibilities is to handle every request that comes from the client-side
and to reply to such requests.
This module is associated with every other module for natural reasons. If that were
not the case, it would not be possible to interact with VACv2, i.e., this object transmits the
user’s intention into the system. Another of its responsibilities is to launch the web server
after a successful initialization of the system. As expected it is not requested by any of
the other modules.
5.1.2 Users Manager Module
This module, as the name indicates, is responsible for handling users. Also, is responsible
for authenticating the user with resort to Active Directory Kerberos Authentication, and
for verifying the authorization of the user to access the solution, in other words, it will
authenticate and verify that the user has access to VACv2.
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After the authentication and confirming the user’s access, it manages the user session
while he is accessing VACv2’s client-side. The View Manager module is the only one to
perform requests to this module. In a first step, it will provide the user information for
authentication, and if successful it also provide a session hash for the User Manager to
maintain, and at every request done by the user, its session will be verified.
5.1.3 Scanner Manager Module
This module was the backbone of VAC and will remain to be the backbone of VACv2.
This module is what enables the communication with the scanning technologies, and
without it, there would be no solution since the purpose of the project is to obtain a
centralized solution for managing scans over critical targets.
There will be no scans if VACv2 cannot successfully establish a connection to the
scanning technology’s appliances. This module is accountable for managing the scanner
technologies available and their appliances. In VACv2, the user is empowered to con-
figure the scanning technologies, i.e., setting the scanning technologies which are to be
considered as for critical use only1. This module will also act as a frontier for the scan-
ning technologies, meaning any other module will not be able to make use of the scanning
technologies unless if it is required to this module.
There are three modules which request services from this module, which are the View
Manager module, the Scan Manager module, and the Results Manager module. The
View Manager module is what allows the user to manage this object and its derivatives.
Concerning the Scan Manager and the Results Manager modules, these need to interact
with this module for being able to launch, track and retrieve information from the scanning
appliances about scans or results.
This module makes use of no other module.
5.1.4 Mailing Manager Module
This module came to simplify VACv2’s notifications, in other words, this module will al-
low the possibility of using distribution lists. It is responsible for keeping every distribu-
tion list and its content, meaning it will hold to every email associated with a distribution
list.
This module is requested by the following modules: View Manager, Scan Manager,
and the Results Manager. The View Manager is what allows the management of the
distribution lists. The Scan Manager and the Results Manager modules are associated
with this module to retrieve the content of the distribution lists to notify about actions
regarding those modules.
1By critical use it is meant scanning technologies that will only be used to scan the most critical assets,
usually because they are paid platforms and provide a higher confidence in the results.
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This module makes use of no other module.
5.1.5 Scan Manager Module
If the Scanner Manager module is the backbone of the solution, then this has to be con-
sidered the CPU of it. This object is responsible for maintaining every scan configuration,
while also being accountable for triggering and managing active scans. Also, for the scans
that have integrators configured, this module will trigger the Results Manager module for
handling the scan results.
The Scan Manager module requests services from the Scanner Manager, Mailing
Manager and the Results Manager modules, and is requested by the View Manager mod-
ule. For natural reasons, it must make use of the Scanner Manager module, to request
scan launches and to track changes to active scans. About the Mailing Manager module,
it is only natural that it gets requested about distribution lists when notifications are to be
sent regarding scan’s actions. The Results Manager module contains the integrators re-
sponsible for uploading the scan results into the DCY’s information repositories. As the
scan configurations contain the property that identifies the integrators which the results
are to be upload. At the end of a scan, the Scan Manager module will request the Results
Manager module for it to handle the scan results.
The View Manager module makes use of this module, for the same reason as it used
all the other modules, to display information regarding the scans to the user, and also to
allow the management of scan configurations.
5.1.6 Results Manager Module
From the previous module, we already can infer the purpose of the Results Manager
module. This module has more responsibilities than just handling DCY’s Information
Repositories integrators, it will also parse the scan’s results for excepted or excluded
events, while also managing every vulnerability event ever reported. This module requests
services from the Scanner Manager and the Mailing Manager modules, and is requested
by the Scan Manager and the View Manager modules.
This module must make use of the Scanner Manager module to request the generation
of a report belonging to a given scan that has occurred, and when the report is generated
to download such the report. The Mailing Manager module is requested by this module
when notifications are to be sent. These notifications intent to notify the distribution list
about the results being available at a given platform.
The View Manager module makes use of this module, for the same reason as all the
other modules, to allow the management of the information regarding the integrators. It
will also allow the creation, update or removal of vulnerability events to except or exclude.
The Scan Manager module requires this module in the scan configuration procedure, and
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to trigger the Results Manager module into its normal routine when a scan as finished.
5.2 Implementation
Now that we have seen the architecture of VACv2 - the main modules, and their purpose
-, its time we move into the implementation details of VACv2. At this point, what is ex-
pected from VACv2 is already known, so in this section, we will see how it was achieved.
This section will be divided into three subsections - the objectives of this work -, and
at each subsection, it will be provided an explanation of each module that suffered from
changes into achieving that particular objective.
5.2.1 Improvement of VAC
The first step of this project was the improvement of the first version of VAC software, to
achieve it the solution’s coding and its architecture had to be understood.
Following, we will analyze each one of the modules affected by the objective Improve-
ment of VAC. Some of the modules already existed, in these cases, it will be provided a
description of what was being achieved by VAC, and after, how the module evolved, and
what is being achieved by VACv2.
User Manager Module
As there was no type of user management in VAC, the structure presented of this object
was developed to meet VACv2’s needs. Illustration 5.2 represents the structure of this
module in VACv2. After, we will get into more detail about the classes contained in the
illustration.
Figure 5.2: VACv2’s User Manager module’s structure
User This class’ purpose is to represent a user that is authorized to access VACv2. The
class is composed of four properties, the user id which is the company’s login as-
signed to the user, the name of the user, the email of the user, and the Kerberos
REALM the user is associated.
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UserManagement This class’ purpose is to maintain the information related to the users
that may access the solution. In other words, it is responsible for storing the User
classes. It will also perform the authentication for the users who try to access the
software, and manage the active sessions. This class is composed of three proper-
ties.
Users A user’s hash, in which the User’s id acts as the key and the User class as
value.
Realms An array of Kerberos’ REALMS. Only the contained ones will be tested
for access.
Session A session’s hash, in which the key corresponds to the cookie serial and the
value is the User’s id.
The normal operation of this module is as follows. In an early stage, the user must
already have been whitelisted in VACv2, and this is due to the authentication proce-
dure which will require information about the user, i.e., the user login, and the Kerberos
REALM.
When the user sets off the login procedure, the User Manager module will try to match
the login contained in the provided credentials with a whitelisted user. If it finds a match,
then with the help of a ruby gem2 that handles the Kerberos protocol - named “omniauth-
kerberos” -, the user’s principal name3 with the provided password by the user at login
will be verified against PT’s Active Directory. If the user gets verified, then he will gain
access to VACv2.
This module also manages user’s sessions. However, it is not responsible for the initial
association between the user with the session hash. When the user first accesses VACv2,
the View Manager module generates the session hash, and when the user checks out, the
session hash will be handed over to this module for it to store. From that point forward,
every time the user performs a request his session will be verified.
This module is responsible for making VACv2 achieve three requirements of the im-
provement of VAC objective, which are:
• Authentication of Users
• Authorized Users (Whitelisting)
• Cookie-based Session - With the synergy of the View Manager module.
Mailing Manager Module
VAC did offer email notifications. However, emails were stated in a non-desirable way.
Illustration 5.3 represents the use of notifications in VAC.
2A gem is equivalent to libraries in other programming languages.
3The Principal Name is the concatenation of the User’s id plus the at symbol [@] plus the User’s Realm.
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Figure 5.3: VAC Email Notification Configuration
From illustration 5.3 it is possible to infer that VAC’s email notifications had to be part
in every scan configuration, even if using the same emails in multiple scan configurations.
The need to perform a single change in the distribution list was a delicate task allied to the
fact that VAC did not allow the edition of objects, which means the original object would
have to be deleted and a new one created to reflect the change.
The Mailing Manager module is responsible for managing the distribution lists in
VACv2, which can be reached out by the other modules. Illustration 5.4 presents the ar-
chitecture of the Mailing Manager module in VACv2. After, we will examine the structure
and purpose of the classes present in the illustration.
Figure 5.4: Mailing Manager module’s internal structure
Person This class is the foundation of this module. Its purpose is the personification of a
person to be notified. It is composed of two properties the name of the person and
its email address.
MailingList This class aims for the aggregation of people to notify, in other words, it will
group Person classes. This class is also composed of two attributes, an identifier,
and an array of Person class.
MailingListManager This class’s objective is to manage mailing lists. It is composed
of a single property, named Mailing list, which is a hash where the Mailing List’s
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identifier acts as the key, and the Mailing List object is the value.
There is no standard operation for this module, due to its secondary character in the so-
lution. Its purpose is to allow a more user-friendly experience for the operator of VACv2.
The expected behavior of this module is to after the creation of a mailing list, when
the user accesses the configuration of a new or an existant scan, to present all the available
mailing lists.
This module accomplished the possibility of creating and managing Mailing Lists in
VACv2, one of the requirements for the present objective we are analyzing.
Scanner Manager Module
This section will now describe the improvements made over the ScannerManager module,
but before, the reader must know how this module behaved in VAC. VACwas only capable
of handling OpenVAS and Nexpose scanning technologies.
Figure 5.5: VAC’s Scanner Manager module internal structure
VAC’s Scanner Manager module is going to be analyzed according to illustration 5.5.
The ScannerManager class was responsible for storing the information related to every
scanner appliance, while also managing them. However, it also kept non-scanner related
objects, more concretely scans and reports.
It is possible to observe that the ScannerManager class had a relation of one-to-many
regarding OpenVAS and Nexpose classes. Despite these classes having no bound, they
were kept in the same property, a hash in which the key was the identifier of the appliance,
and the value was the object itself.
OpenVAS and Nexpose classes represented an appliance of that scanning technology,
and despite these classes were independent, they were developed to had a similar struc-
ture, where both had the following properties:
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• Appliance Identifier
• Scanning Technology
• Host
• Username & Password
• Hash - for extra information
It was through these classes that VAC was able to use the scanning technologies appli-
ances, with resort to custom libraries - OpenVASLib and NexposeLib. NexposeLib was
the library which provided an API for establishing a communication with the Nexpose
appliances, and OpenVASLib represented the same but for OpenVAS appliances.
The improvement of VAC objective required the complete revisit of this structure, and
the objective was to empower the user with the capability of managing the scanning tech-
nologies from top to bottom. Image 5.6 presents the structure of this module in VACv2,
and then we will examine VACv2’s Scanner Manager module based on the illustration.
Figure 5.6: VACv2’s Scanner Manager module internal structure
Technology The purpose of this class is to allow the system to load scanning technolo-
gies classes4 at runtime, to store them, and to instantiate them when needed. The
technology class at system initialization will load every scanning technology class
4The term scanning technology class is a reference to the classes that are meant to establish a connection
between VACv2 and the scanner technology appliance. These classes can be seen as being a personification
of the scanner technology appliances in VACv2.
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in conditions5 of being loaded. After this procedure, the classes discovered become
available to VACv2. However, as they were loaded at runtime, they have to be
stored by this class and have to be required to this class.
ApplianceScope PT has its internal network divided into multiple virtual LANs (vLAN)
to prevent potential attacks from spreading on the entire internal network. A name
is provided to every one of the vLANs to identify them more easily. PT’s intent is
that Qualys contains a scanning appliance in every vLAN.
What this class achieves is the association of an appliance with a network in VACv2.
This class is necessary because appliances in different vLANs have different targets
for acting. The way this works is through the use of its attributes, which are the
following:
Type String with two possible values: “external” or “custom”. The “external”
value is a reference to an appliance that is outside of PT’s perimeter, meaning
it will only perform external scans. While the “custom” value is the opposite,
meaning it refers to an internal appliance, which can only perform internal
scans.
Id This field is set accordingly to the value of the type property. If type value is
“external”, this field is ignored, but when the type value is “custom”, this field
will contain the name of the vLAN where the appliance is deployed.
ApplianceInstance Despite VAC’s OpenVAS and Nexpose classes having a similar struc-
ture, it is possible to acknowledge that it was missing a vital piece, common ground
to ensure the same structure between those two classes, and new ones that might be
coming.
This class pretends to represent a scanning technology appliance, and it holds the
structure that the scanning technology classes6 will inherit.
The purpose of this class is the standardization of the coding solution. This class
will ensure that all scanning technology classes have the same structure. In other
words, it will detach VACv2 from any scanning technologies classes, this way not
needing any development to VACv2’s core to support new scanning technology
classes. This class is composed of the following attributes:
• Appliance id
• Host
5For a scanning technology class to be loaded, there are a couple of requirements that need to be met, or
the Technology class will not recognize it. These requirements are: At a specific directory, it needs to exist
a subdirectory which name has to be equal to the class that will be loaded, and this class has to be placed
inside this subdirectory.
6These scanning technologies class are the ones discovered by the Technology class.
Chapter 5. VACv2 Design & Implementation 57
• Appliance Scope
• Username & Password
• Hash - for extra configurations
OpenVAS & Nexpose Each of these classes, will handle its scanning technology for
VACv2. These are the classes that will be recognized by the Technology class,
which means that these are also the classes that will have to extend the Appliance-
Instance class, meaning that OpenVAS and Nexpose classes will inherit the methods
belonging to the ApplianceInstance class.
These classes will then handle the inherited methods according to its scanning tech-
nology demands. In a nutshell, these classes will receive the input from VACv2 and
translate it to the scanning technologies through the custom libraries.
AppliancesManager This class’s purpose is to provide control over a scanning technol-
ogy to the operator of VACv2, while also to be a technology aggregator, meaning it
will exist one AppliancesManager object by Scanning Technology.
One responsibility of this class is to store every information relative to the technol-
ogy. Another responsibility is to store and manage every ApplianceInstance object
concerning the associated technology.
The ApplianceManager class is composed of the following properties:
• Scanning Technology
• Modules’ List - List of the available scanning types of the technology. In
other words, the possible scanning types to perform. E.g., Vulnerability Man-
agement.
• Critical - Flag to indicate if the technology is to be used for critical scans only.
• ApplianceInstance’s Hash
• Subnetworks’ Array - Subnetworks where the available ApplianceInstances
objects in VACv2 belonging to this scanning technology are operating
• Templates’ List - Scanning templates available to this technology
• Hash - for extra configurations
Scanner Manager In VACv2, the context of this class was reduced to scanner-related
functions and objects, meaning it was liberated from every other object not strictly
related to scanners, i.e., scans or reports. In other words, the scanner manager
will no longer be responsible for supervising active scans, or reports. This class’s
purpose is to act as VACv2’s interface for the scanners structure. This object is the
point of entry of any request made to the Scanner Manager structure.
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Concerning the old procedures of supervising active scan or reports, in VACv2
this object will be requested by the responsible modules to perform operations or
provide updates related to their tasks in the scanning technology’s appliances.
This class is composed of two properties:
• ApplianceManager’s Hash
• Hash - for extra configurations
The normal operation of this module is as follows. At software initialization, the
Technology class will find the available ApplianceInstance specialization classes, load
and store them. The ScannerManager class is associated with the Technology class, and
this association is what allows for the instantiation of the classes that extend the Applian-
ceInstance.7 The next step is loading the previous state of the software, which will only
occur when the system detects the existence of files used for saving the previous state.
After system initialization, the ApplianceManager class periodically make requests to
each appliance for monitoring purposes, e.g., for testing the connection to the appliance,
or for knowledge of the number of scans currently active, et cetera. Three entities interact
with the Scanner Manager module:
• Scan Manager module
• Results Manager module
• View Manager module
The Scan Manager makes requests to this module for launching new scans, and to get
information about active scans. The Result Manager makes requests to this module for
launching new reports over recently finished scans, for tracking the progress of the report
generation and when it finishes, to request the download of the report. When the report
is downloaded, the class that supersedes the ApplianceInstance will handle the raw data
provided by the scanner technology into a VACv2’s internal object. If this were not the
case, VACv2 would still be attached to the scanning technologies. The internal object is
named ReportInstance and will be approach ahead.
The View Manager enables the interaction of the user with the module, but also is
responsible for improving the user experience in the client-side, e.g., when configuring a
scan, the user will have at its disposal a checkbox related to the scanning technology that
will affect the remaining properties if enabled or disabled. The previous example tries to
transmit that all the fields displayed in the client-side of the solution will be previously
loaded, to make the user make the best decision with the smallest effort possible. The
7As the specialization classes are not loaded at initialization phase but rather at running phase, they
cannot be instantiated as the other classes because they are not available to the system.
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View Manager will allow the user to customize all the configurations from the Scanner
Manager to the OpenVAS or the Nexpose. Also, will be able to create, update or re-
move ApplianceInstance’s objects, with an additional feature of pausing or resuming, the
interaction of VACv2 with the correspondent appliance.
Another situation is the fact that this module is now able to match a target to a network.
When a user is configuring a new scan, and after the information is submitted, before
being accepted, the Scanner Manager module will validate the targets. The validation
consists of verifying if the targets are valid for scanning, it will try to match the targets
with a network - internal or not. The targets can be scattered over different networks. If a
target is set in a network that VACv2 contains no appliance to operate, or if it is contained
in a signaled range that is not for scanning, then the target will be marked as non-valid,
and therefore the scan configuration will not be accepted.
In VACv2, the operator can choose what scanning technology will perform the scan
by tunning two properties while making the scan configuration, which are:
Critical A check property. When is checked, it means that the scanning technology to be
used is one of the marked for critical assets scanning.
Templates This property is affected by the previous one, it will only present the templates
belonging to the scanning technologies which are flagged according to the critical
property. When the critical property is checked, this property will only present tem-
plates from scanning technologies marked in VACv2 as being for critical use only.
If the critical property is not checked, then it will present the templates belonging
to the technologies that in VACv2 are not marked as being for critical use. When
choosing a template, they are separated by technology, allowing the operator to
know which technology will perform the scan. Figure 5.7 illustrates this property
as it is presented in the client-side.
Figure 5.7: Critical Scanning Technologies’ Templates
The improvement made to this module increased the functionality of the software in
quite a bit. Concerning the first objective of this project - Improvement of VAC-, this
module has achieved the following requirements:
• Automatical Identification of Targets
• Loading Technologies at runtime
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Scan Manager Module
This particular module did not exist in VAC. Scans used to be managed with resort to two
other modules: the Scheduler and the Scanner Manager modules. Each one of them had
distinct tasks delegated.
The Scheduler module was responsible for storing every scan configuration, and also
to trigger the launch of scans when the time came. The action of launching scans consisted
in passing the scan configuration into the Scanner Manager module, which marked the end
of the association of that scan with the Scheduler module.
From that point on, the Scanner Manager module would become responsible for
launching the scans, while keeping track of the active scans. When the scans ended,
the Scanner Manager module would request the generation of the correspondent report,
download it when available, parsed the results and then delivered the data to the Results
Manager module.
VACv2’s ScanManager module contains the focus of only being concerned with scan-
related objects. This module can be seen as an evolution of VAC’s Scheduler module.
However, let’s start by analyzing VAC’s Scheduler module structure illustrated in figure
5.8.
Figure 5.8: VAC’s Scheduler module internal structure
AvailablePeriod This class intended to achieve a concept that exists in some scanning
technologies. This class established an association between a host group with an
availability period to perform the scan. In other words, the scan could only occur
inside a specific time frame. If the scan exceeded that frame, then it would be
paused, and when back inside the window, resumed.
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HostGroup This class’s purpose was to aggregate the hosts that were the targets of the
scan. In VAC, it was only possible to make VM scans, which means that the target
could only be IP addresses.
Frequency This class allowed to set a frequency to the scan. It was also used for de-
termining the next time for the scan to occur after the present iteration. However,
the calculus done was somewhat rudimentary, it would just sum the number of days
corresponding to the frequency option chosen.
SpontaneousScan & PeriodicScan Both these classes try to personify the same, a scan
configuration. Their purpose was to gather all the information regarding a scan. Be-
sides the associations with the Frequency and the Hostgroup classes, these classes
are composed of the following properties:
• Scan Name
• Scan Template
• Hash - for extra configurations, e.g., the criticality property.
Scheduler The Scheduler class, contained two purposes. The first was to store all the
scan configurations - SpontaneousScan and PeriodicScan classes. The second was
to launch the scans when it reached their scheduled time. The launch of the scan
consisted in passing the scan configuration to the Scanner Manager module while
also requesting this module to launch the scan over that configuration, thus finishing
its interaction concerning this scan.
In VAC the lack of a specific manager for handling scans was considered to be urg-
ing, given that in VACv2 the scanning type scope was to be augmented, leading to the
development of the Scan Manager module in VACv2. VACv2’s Scan Manager module is
illustrated in image 5.9.
As the reader might notice, VACv2’s Scan Manager module structure is significantly
different from the structure VAC used to use to handle scans. At a glance the differences
are:
• Absence of the Scheduler class
• Removal of the PeriodicScan and SpontaneousScan classes
• Replacement of the HostGroup class
• Removal of the AvailablePeriodic class
Let’s now analyze this changes in more detail. The Scheduler class got directly re-
placed by the ScanManager class. The PeriodicScan and the SpontaneousScan had the
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Figure 5.9: VACv2’s Scan Manager module internal structure
same purpose with a different recurrence, so these two got replaced by the ScanInfo class,
which contains an association with the Schedule class for setting the scan recurrence. The
HostGroup class got replaced by the Target class, and this class contains an association
with a TargetObject, which its purpose is to allow multiple scanning types in VACv2.
Finally, the AvailablePeriod was entirely removed from the solution, not because of the
feature itself, but because DCY’s operators did not use that feature and requested its re-
moval.
The classes illustrated in figure 5.9 are described in more detail next.
ScanInfo The scan recurrence was no motive for handling scans in a different manner,
meaning that VACv2’s ScanInfo replaced VAC’s SpontaneousScan and Periodic-
Scan classes.
To allow multiple scanning types and ensure that the ScanInfo class does not get at-
tached to any scan type, the ScanInfo will aggregate all the scan data. Its properties
are:
• ScanId - This property holds the Scan Identifier in VACv2.
• CreationDate - This property will contain the date and time of when the Scan
Configuration was created.
• Schedule - This is a pointer to an object that will contain all the information
related to the frequency and scheduling of this scan configuration. It will be
analyzed ahead.
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• Target - This is a pointer to an object that will contain all the information
related to the type of the scan and the target of the scan. This object is the key
to the ScanInfo class getting detached from any scan types, this way making
the Scan Manager module more scalable. This object will be analyzed ahead.
• Integrators - This is an array that will contain Integrators’ identifiers. It will
point to the integrators to use when uploading the scan’s results. However,
this property is related to the third objective of this project, meaning it will be
analyzed ahead.
• Email - This is a hash where all the notifications-related data is stored. From
the MailingList’s Id to custom titles or custom messages. Also in VACv2, the
Operator is allowed to choose which scan states will trigger a notification, this
information will also be stored in this hash.
Schedule This class’s purpose is to associate a frequency type with a scan. It keeps all
data related to the scheduling of the scans. It is composed of four properties:
• Recurrence - Contains more of an informational character, holds the type of
schedule, its possible values are: Now, Once, Daily, Weekly, or Monthly.
• LastScanStartingDate - Last time that a scan was launch based on the config-
uration available in the ScanInfo.
• LastScanEndingDate - Ending time of the scan belonging to the LastScanStart-
ingDate property.
• NextScanDate - Future date to launch the associated scan configuration.
NonPeriodic & Periodic Both these classes extend the Schedule class, each one of them
holds to properties suitable to its frequency type.
For a non-periodic scan, all that is needed is a DateTime property. This property’s
type is internal to Ruby and will hold the date and time in the same property, its
value will correspond to when the scan configuration associated should be launched.
For a periodic scan, there is the need to store both the date and time. However, in
this case, the date and time cannot be stored in a DateTime property, being stored in
two separate objects. The time property contains the purpose of indicating the time
at which the scan should be launched. However, the date property will not be that
straightforward. The date property will act as a restraint to the scan, in other words,
the scan will only be unblocked when the date value has passed.
Now, Once, Daily, Weekly, Monthly These classes are an extent to the types of sched-
ules that exist in VACv2, the Now and Once classes extend the NonPeriodic class,
while the remaining extend the Periodic class.
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The Now, Once and Daily classes only contain the properties inherited by their
superclass, the Weekly and Monthly classes have more properties given their extra
complexity. Let’s now analyze each case:
Now & Once The DateTime property will hold the schedule of when to launch the
scan configuration. The difference between these classes is that the Now class
will automatically fulfill the property value with the present time, while the
Once class will let the operator choose the date and time.
Daily The date property will restrain the scan has already said, blocking the scan
from being launch until that date is reached, in that day and each day forward,
a scan will be launched at the value contained in the time property.
Weekly The date and time properties work the same as the Daily class, but this
class contains one more property, the weekDay. This property will contain the
day of the week the scan is to be launched and will launch the scan every week
only on that weekday.
Monthly The most complex structure of all. The date and time properties work the
same as the Daily class. However, this class contains three more properties
because it contemplates two cases. The first situation is about working with
the week number and weekday, while the second will work over the day of
the month, the next example will help to understand how it works. E.g., every
month third Tuesday, or every month fifth.
Each of the Periodic classes will compute the next date for the scan to occur after
the previous scan finishes and will do it accordingly to the class’s properties.
Target The purpose of this class is to detach the ScanInfo class from being scan type
specific. This class will collect the properties which are common to every scanning
technology, the properties are:
• Critical and Technology - Allows to uniquely identify the scanning technology
that is to perform the scan.
• Type - The scan type to perform.
• ProfileId and ProfileName - The scan template to be used.
• Target - A TargetObject object, this is the object which will contain the scan-
specific properties to be used in the scan. It will be analyzed ahead.
TargetObject To detach the Target class from having to know every scan type that might
come to exist, which means to prevent the addition of every property required to
each scan type, a couple of measures had to be made. The first step was the creation
of a class to hold to those specific scan-type properties. However, when a new scan
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type was to be added into VACv2, that class would need an additional development,
which is not desirable. Another way is to make a class to be extended by more
specific classes, this way the Target class and this class do not have to be altered,
ever.
The purpose of this class is to make a “bridge” between the Target class and the
scan-specific classes, and as there are no common properties between scan-type
classes this class will contain no properties.
VMTarget This class can be seen as a replacement for VAC’s HostGroup. It is pretended
that this class collects all the necessary information related to a Vulnerability Man-
agement scan.
VM scans only need the IP addresses that will be the target of the scan, and then
this class contains a single property, an array with all the IP addresses that are the
target of the scan.
ActiveScan As previously seen, the ScanInfo object is responsible for containing all the
scan data. However, when launching a scan, other properties need to be taken into
consideration. Also, the ScanInfo object will continue to have data that matter
while the scan is running and after the scan finishes, this means that the user cannot
change this object when the scan is launched to prevent inconsistencies.
The ActiveScan class contains a similar purpose to the ScanInfo class in the way
that it will aggregate all the information related to a scan instance, which in other
words, means that this class will represent an active scan instance in VACv2. This
class will contain every information required by VACv2 for it to be able to manage
every step from the launch of the scan until the result’s processing. This class is
composed of three properties:
• ReferenceId - In any scanning technology when a scan is launched, it will
be assigned an identifier to the scan commonly known as referenceId, this
property will hold to that value. In other words, this property will identify the
active scan instance in the scanning platform.
• ActiveScanInfo - This is a pointer to an object that will contain all the infor-
mation related to the scan instance. This object will be analyzed ahead.
• ScanInfo - At the creation of the ActiveScan class to prevent any inconsisten-
cies, as mentioned at the beginning of the description of this class, a clone of
the original ScanInfo object is made. This ScanInfo class is a pointer to the
clone object. This way, if changes are made when the scan has been initiated,
it will only be reflected in the next scan.
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ActiveScanInfo This class’s purpose is to store VACv2’s internal information related to
the active scan instance. This class is composed of four properties:
• ScanName - When a scan is launched, the name assigned to the scan will
consist in a concatenation of static prefix - “VAC-SCAN” - plus a suffix which
corresponds to the date and time of the scan. This property is equivalent to
the ActiveScan’s referenceId, but this is more user-friendly, and will uniquely
identify the scan instance.
• InternalStatus - Each scanning technology contains its scanning states. The
specific class which extends the ScannerManager module’s ApplianceInstance
class will make a mapping between the technology’s scan’s states and an in-
ternal state belonging to VACv2. Its values range from Scheduled to Running
and to Complete in case of success, or Error in case of error. This property
will contain VACv2’s scanning state.
• ApplianceId - When launching a scan, there will be an appliance that will be
in charge of the scan, this property will store the VACv2’s ApplianceInstance
id.
• ErrorHash - When a scan fails, usually some other information is provided
regarding the motive why the scan as failed. This hash will store the informa-
tion provided by the scanning technology, as well as it will store any errors
that might occur while processing in VACv2. The information stored in this
property will be presented to the operator.
PastScan This class intends to provide information about past scans to the user. All its
values were already mentioned in previous classes. The difference is that all the
properties contained in this class are inherited from the ActiveScan’s properties,
and these will be changed into strings, given the informational character of this
class.
ScanManager This class can be seen as an improvement over VAC’s Scheduler class.
This class is equivalent to the ScannerManager class in the Scanner Manager mod-
ule way that it is the interface class that will handle any requests that might come
to this module.
The ScanManager class contains the purpose of storing any scan-related object, to
manage active scans - from the launch until the finish -, and to trigger the Results
Manager module to handle the scan’s results if the scan is successful. This class
will also trigger notifications for the scans which have notification active.
This class is composed of four attributes, and all have been analyzed except for the
configurations’ hash, this property is for setting up some extra configuration that
might come in the future.
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The normal functioning of this module is explained over the next few paragraphs.
The ScanManager class will periodically perform a routine check to verify if any scan
configuration needs to be launched, or if any active scan is in a requiring attention state.
If at least one scan configuration has reached its launching time, a new ActiveScan
object will be created, and it is requested to the Scanner Manager module to launch the
scan. Concerning the ActiveScan objects, the requiring attention state means that the
scan has finished. When a scan finishes, it means that, or the scan is complete or the scan
stopped for some reason, in any way, only in case of success the ActiveScan object will
be passed to the Results Manager module. Finally, and regardless of what the final state
of the scan is, a PastScan object will always be created based on the ActiveScan object.
The explanation of the module made it easy to understand when the Scan Manager
module performs requests to the Scanner Manager and the Results Manager modules.
The Mailing Manager module is used at the launch or the end of a scan - if such was
configured. The Mailing Manager module is required to retrieve the distribution list’s
emails where the notifications are to be sent.
To avoid the possibility of getting the solution into an inconsistent state, there is no
other way to configure new scan configurations but through the client-side.
Considering that these changes were provided in the context of the first objective of
this report - Improvement of VAC. This implementation achieved the following goals:
• Correlation Data Integrators8
• Improvement of Scan Recurrence
• Notifications & Custom Mailing
View Manager Module
The View Manager module did not exist in VAC. This module is responsible for connect-
ing every module to the presentation layer, while also firing up the web server responsible
for handling the clients’ requests. Image 5.10 will illustrate the structure of this module.
The View Manager module contains a pretty simple architecture being a single class
- the ViewManager class - associated with all other modules. Otherwise, the exchange of
information between the client-side and the server-side would not work. The ViewMan-
ager class is also associated with the web server.
The ViewManager class will unite VACv2’s modules with the VACv2App web server
and fire it up. The VACv2App is an extension of “thin”[20], a fast and simple web server
developed in Ruby. The web server will set up a few configurations to ensure a more
secure communication with the client. Configurations like setting the certificate and key
8What was accomplished at this point, will be mentioned in the third objective of this project.
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Figure 5.10: VACv2’s View Manager module internal structure
to be used in the communication with the client, or setting the strict-transport-security
header or the secure flag in the cookies, are a few examples.
The web server is responsible for handling the client’s requests. It will receive the
requests, validate them in a first instance, and then pass these requests to the responsible
VACv2’s modules. When the module finishes executing, it will get back to the VACv2App
with the answer to be provided to the client, and VACv2App will build a response object
an send it to the client.
The VACv2App web server is also responsible for assigning cookies to the users, this
is done with resort to a Ruby library name “SessionAuth”. When the client authenticates
successfully, the cookie is stored by the UsersManager module.
In the end, this module contributed to the achievement of the following goals:
• Cookie-based Session
• Data Pre-Load
• Improvement of Data Management (Creation, Update, and Removal)
Other Modules
Besides the modules already approach, through the development of this objective, some
other modules were made to achieve specific purposes. Next, there will be a small de-
scription of these extra modules, and what it was possible to obtain with their assistance.
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Logging Module This module as the name indicates is related to the logging of VACv2
software. This module is scattered over the entire solution. Its logs are intended to
help in the analysis of a problem or to find a potential bug. One of the goals at this
stage of the project was precisely to improve the logging of the solution.
Logging in VAC consisted in creating an object at initialization phase, and that
object would be passed at every method call as a parameter. In VACv2 the logging
module is a singleton, which means it is available to any object in the solution.
Illustration 5.11a is showing an example of VAC’s logging, while image 5.11b is
presenting a piece of logging supplied by VACv2.
(a) VAC’s Logs
(b) VACv2’s Logs
Figure 5.11: Scanner Manager Module Interactions
Ciphering Module The ciphering module did not exist in the original VAC solution, and
its purpose is to cipher VACv2’s critical information, which meets directly one of
the goals for this objective of improvement of VAC. This class is a singleton, and
each class that contains sensitive information must make use off this module, the
way it works is when a class is saving its state into a file, and one of its properties
includes sensitive data, e.g., a password, it would call this module to cipher the
password. On the reverse, when loading one of the classes that contain sensitive
information, then it would use this module to decipher the password.
Email Dispatcher The email dispatcher module did not exist in VAC, the Scheduler class
was in charge of building and sending the notification emails. In VACv2, this class,
which is a singleton class, provides the email functionality for all the solution.
Three modules are using the increased functionality achieved with this class in
VACv2, which are:
Logging module When a critical log is written, the Logging module will also send
an email notifying the owner of the solution.
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Scan Manager It is the class that triggers the start and end of a scan.
Results Manager Notify that the scan results were uploaded to a platform and are
available. However, we will get back to this ahead.
Network Manager This singleton class is only used by the Scanner Manager module’s
ApplianceScope class, for consulting which networks are associated with an appli-
ance.
At startup time it will load a file with the network structure into memory, the file
is illustrated in image 5.12. In the file, a set of ranges are assigned to an internal
network, identifiable by the network name, and so on.
Figure 5.12: VACv2’s Network Manager boot file structure
When requested by an ApplianceScope class to find if any of the ranges include
the address passed as an argument, it will look through all the ranges, and if the IP
address is in range of any of these networks, it will then provide the name of the
network.
Client-Side
The frontend side of the solution had to be changed, to reflect the new functionalities and
improvements made over the solution. This section will briefly describe the client-side
solution and what is now available to the client on each page. Please keep in mind that the
next illustrations already reflect the final state of the project. However, only the changes
that were originated on the actual objective - Improvement of VAC -, will be addressed.
The original client-side solution used Bootstrap 3[2], which is a framework for devel-
oping HTML, CSS, and Javascript. Each of the previous programming languages serves
a purpose. The first is for building the web pages, the second for styling the web pages,
and the last for programming the web pages. The client-side solution of VACv2 kept the
same framework.
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Let’s now start analyzing the differences in the client-side solution.
Login Page
Figure 5.13: Login Page
Illustration 5.13 corresponds to the new first page when accessing VACv2. The high-
lighted popout is illustrating that server-client communication is ciphered.
Dashboard Page
Figure 5.14: Dashboard Page
Illustration 5.14 is the result of the redirect action after successful login into the VACv2.
In this page, it is displayed two tables. The first table presents the scheduled scans for
the day and their current state, while the second table presents the past scans that have
occurred.
Illustration 5.15 is exemplifying the type of data accessible from the upcoming scans
table. It not only presents the scans scheduled for the day as it will track down their
current state.
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Figure 5.15: Dashboard’s Upcoming Scans’ Table - Scan Detail
Identified by number one is the table where the scheduled and active scans are, and
provides enough information to quickly allow the operator to identify if something might
have gone wrong or not. The button illustrated by number two will present more informa-
tion regarding the associated scan, as exemplified by the popout identified by the number
three. The popout provides a more detailed view of the scan, allowing the operator to see
the scan configuration, while also presenting information that will allow him to track the
scan in the scanning technology as well.
Figure 5.16: Dashboard’s Past Scans’ Table - Detailed View
Illustration 5.16 reflects the bottom table which is the Past Scans table. The purpose
of this table is to provide a historical list of every executed scan. The reader might even
notice that the rows displayed are in green, this is an indicator that scan ran successfully
if it was presented in red, then the scan would have finished with an error state.
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From this table, the operator will be able to tell which was the scanning technology
in charge of the scan, when the scan took place, the targets of the scan, where the results
have been uploaded to, and so on. The highlight identified by number one pretends to
show the reader the Scan Id of the scan configuration, which is the identifier of the scan
configuration in VACv2, and the scan name illustrates a scan instance that has occurred
for that scan configuration.
Administration Menu
Figure 5.17: Administration Menu
The Administration Menu - illustrated in figure 5.17 - is available through the cogwheel
placed in the upper-right corner of each page. The pages available at this place are more
related to the management of VACv2 rather than the tool operation.
User’s Page
Illustration 5.18 presents the page that makes possible the management of users. There
are two tables available, the first is related to the users, and the second related to realms.
For a user to access VACv2, it must be included in the user’s table. The Realms’ table
ensures that VACv2 will only try to authenticate users located in those Realms. If a user
contains an association to a Realm that is not specified in this table, then he will not be
able to login into the app.
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Figure 5.18: Users’ Management
Scanner’s Page
Illustration 5.19 is related to the management of the scanning technologies and its appli-
ances. The top table portrays the scanning technologies which were recognized and are
now available to use, while the second table portrays the scanning technology’s appliances
added into the system.
Figure 5.19: Scanners’ Management
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From the Technologies table is possible to understand which technologies are being
used for critical scans, also identified by number 1 is the extended view of the table which
shows the additional configurations associated with the scanning technology.
The Appliance’s table quickly depicts the overall situation of the existing appliances.
Identified by the numbers two to six is presented information related to the appliance and
its status. Let’s address the meaning of each highlighted column:
Number Two IP address of the appliance.
Number Three Appliance’s technology.
Number Four Appliance’s scope, in other words, refers to which network the appliance
is deployed and is responsible.
Number Five Status of the connection between VACv2 and the appliance.
Number Six Pause/Resume system. If the appliance is paused, then VACv2 will not
communicate with this appliance.
Figure 5.20: Technologies’ Table - Technology Detail
Image 5.20 illustrates the update panel of a technology. It is not possible to add new
configurations over the interface only to edit the current ones. Additional configurations
can only be added in the solution’s back-end files, and this is because these configurations,
most likely, will have to be referenced in the solution’s coding. Highlighted in red, is the
checkbox that will activate or deactivate the technology for being used in critical scans.
VAC had this feature hardcoded into the solution.
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Figure 5.21: Appliances’ Table - Add Appliance
Image 5.21 illustrates the addition of a new appliance. The procedure is pretty straight-
forward, and only the elements highlighted might need extra explanation about what their
purpose is. When choosing the Technology value, the Server Configurations section will
sync automatically according to the additional configurations configured for that scanning
technology.
Mailing List Page
Figure 5.22: Mailing Lists Management
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Illustration 5.22 is showing the Mailing List section, and this is one of the most straight-
forward pages in the app. This image illustrates the creation of a new mailing list, and to
achieve that, what needs to be done is to set the Mailing List’s Id, and then declare the
name and email of the people who are to be notified9.
Figure 5.23: Confirmation Popout
Image 5.23 displays a confirmation for the creation of the new Email List. The pur-
pose of this image is to show that, when performing a create, update or delete action,
confirmation popouts will be prompt to the user for confirmation of intent.
Figure 5.24: Mailing Lists’ Table - Detail View
Image 5.24 portrays the Mailing List table and the information that it presents. As the
reader might see it is very trivial, showing only the Ids, and when expanded it will present
the emails associated with the list.
9Although both the Name and Email properties are required, the Name property contains an informa-
tional character.
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Scan’s Page
Figure 5.25: Scan’s Management & Scan Configuration
Illustration 5.25 depicts the Scan’s page. This illustration is showing two screens, repre-
sented by the letter “a” is the view we get when accessing this page, and that is composed
of a table with the scans configured. The letter “b” represents the view of configuring a
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new scan10, and there are multiple fields to fulfill. A brief description of the fields lies
next:
1. Scan Configuration Id - This is the property which will identify the scan, and its
occurrences within the platform.
2. Scan recurrence - There are five options, and accordingly to the one that has been
chosen it will be shown correspondent fields to fill.
3. Scan type - The tab name represents the scan type which is being configured.
4. Scanning Template - Both the critical and template properties highlighted here, will
define the scanning technology that will perform the scan, and with which template.
5. Target’s of the scan - This area is where the targets of a VM scan are stated.
6. Integrators - This is related to the third objective of this project, Results treating &
Data correlation. For that reason will get back to this later on.
7. Email Alerts - This section will activate notifications for this scan configuration.
The operator will be able to choose which states of the scan will trigger a notifica-
tion. Also, it will have to choose a mailing list to send the notifications.
8. Custom Email - This section provides the operator with the power to customize the
title or the body of every notification to be sent.
Figure 5.26: Scan Configurations’ Table - Detailed View
10This is similar to a scan edit screen, the difference is that the scan edit will present the actual values
configures in that appliance
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Illustration 5.26 depicts the detailed view of the table highlighted by the letter “a”
displayed in image 5.25. In this figure, it is presented three different scan configurations.
Let’s analyze the first scan configuration, and see the information that is possible to
extract from this table. The first scan is a scan that will occur monthly, and the next scan
date will be the May 15th, it is a VM scan, and will be executed by Qualys which is a
technology for critical targets. From the additional information we know that this scan
is still to occur, the targets of the scan, the integrators were the results are going to be
uploaded to, and finally, that this scan will notify the mailing list “Demo Mailing List” at
scan start and scan end.
At this point, the reader might have already noticed a yellow button in some of the
images presented previously, this is the edit/update button, which will open the corre-
sponding object with the configuration saved in VACv2. This was one of the goals to
achieve in this Improvement of VAC objective, and it did make the software jump con-
cerning usability and user-friendliness.
5.2.2 Addition of a new Scanning Technology into VACv2
This section reflects the changes done over VACv2 to achieve the second objective, the
addition of a new scanning technology. For VACv2 to interact with Qualys - the new
scanning technology - it will be with resort to the Qualys’ API. However, there is no
Library provided by Qualys or by Ruby to make use of Qualys’s API.
Qualys scanning technology performs not only Vulnerability Management scan but
also Web Application Scanning scans, meaning a new scanning type will be introduced
into VACv2.
This section will have a similar structure to the previous one, presenting only the
modules affected by this transformation. The difference is that all modules affected are
working towards the same goal, instead of attaining smaller goals to achieve the higher
objective, as in the previous section.
Scanner Manager Module
Having into consideration the state of this module regarding the first objective, let’s now
have a look at the changes made to contemplate the new scanning technology.
From illustration 5.27, the reader can recognize that the only addition to the solution
was the Qualys-related classes. Concerning VACv2, the inclusion of the new scanning
technology class ran smoothly, Qualys class, this class will handle the proceedings re-
quired by the scanning technology to perform the scans, and will also perform the inter-
pretation of the responses provided by Qualys into VACv2.
However, like said before, there was no available resource in Ruby to make use of the
Qualys’ API, meaning that a custom library to make requests to Qualys’ platform, and re-
ceived the responses also had to be developed for VACv2 to become able to communicate
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Figure 5.27: VACv2’s Scanner Manager module internal structure with Qualys
Technology
with the scanning technology. The GET and POST functions made to allow the custom
Qualys library to communicate with Qualys’ API were built with resort to a Ruby library
named “httparty”. Regarding authentication, Qualys allows basic authentication, which
means that at every request the username and password were sent to Qualys in the request
headers.
Let’s now have a closer look at the developed classes, and what is pretended by them.
QualysVMModule & QualysWASModule These two classes denote the same objec-
tive, a module in Qualys. The first represents the Vulnerability Management mod-
ule while the second represents the Web Application Scanning module.
Qualys contains several cloud applications, and PT acquired two that are being
used in the project: Vulnerability Management (VM) and Web Application Scan-
ning (WAS). The VM is related to infrastructure security by finding assets’ vulner-
abilities, while WAS is related to web application security, which will explore web
applications for vulnerabilities.
QualysVMModule & QualysWASModule might be seen as enabler classes, in other
words, these will provide the necessary methods for Qualys class to interact with
Qualys platform each in their correspondent module. These are the classes that will
allow the Qualys class to perform actions like launching a scan, and so on.
Qualys This class contains the same structure as Nexpose and Openvas, meaning it ex-
tends the ApplianceInstance class. Qualys class implements the methods inherited
from the ApplianceInstance class, and through these methods, it is able to accom-
plish the needs of both VACv2 as of Qualys platform. In other words, VACv2
pretends to automate the actual procedures that are done by DCY’s personnel, for
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this to happen, it will have to handle the technologies by itself, and while doing so
it has to accomplish every step required by the scanning technologies, i.e., a scan
launch action in VACv2 will coincide with a few steps in the technology. Table
5.1 will illustrate that precisely, what a VACv2 action will correspond in Qualys
scanning technology.
VM Scan Type
VACv2 Qualys Platform
Launch Scan  ! Add Host Addresses
 ! Create Asset Groups
 ! Launch Scan
Scan State  ! Get Scan Information
Launch Report  ! Launch Scan Report
Report State  ! Get Report Information
Download Report  ! Download Report
Table 5.1: Match of VACv2’s actions in Scanner Manager module internal structure with
Qualys Technology
Let’s now dissect two of VACv2’s actions stated in the previous table: the Launch
Scan and the Download Report.
• The launch scan action in VACv2 corresponds to three actions in Qualys, and
this is because Qualys requires three steps before launching a scan.
1. The targets of the scan have to be stated in the platform. Otherwise, for
security reasons, Qualys will block any scans to IP addresses not stated
to prevent accidental scans.
2. This step is the aggregation of IP addresses with the same characteris-
tics. As previously said, PT has its internal network divided into multi-
ple subnetworks, and a service typically contains IP addresses scattered
over multiple internal networks. Qualys contains an object named As-
set Group, which aggregates IP addresses, and allows the association of a
scanning appliance to that Asset Group, ensuring that the assets contained
in the Asset Group will all be scanned by that appliance. In other words,
this object will associate the IP addresses contained in a given internal
network with an appliance acting in that same network.
3. Finally, the last action is precisely the launch of the scan, in this step, all
the Asset Groups must be referenced, which means that only a scan is
needed to be created instead of performing a scan to every Asset group.
Also, this is where the scan template will be defined.
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• Let’s now analyze the Download Report action, this action from the Qualys
platform has nothing else to add. However, that is not the case with VACv2.
In more detail, Qualys class is the only one with the knowledge of the report
structure sent by Qualys. Qualys class is responsible for mapping the results
into an internal object - ReportInstance. The ReportInstance object was made
to personify any scanning technology report in VACv2. However, as it makes
part of the third objective of this project, we will get into more details ahead.
Scan Manager Module
Having into consideration illustration 5.9, which introduces the changes done over this
module after the development made to achieve the first objective, let’s now have a look at
image 5.28 that presents the changes made to achieve the second objective of this project.
The addition of the Qualys scanning technology made changes to this module due to
Qualys containing one other scanning module that VACv2 was not yet ready to handle.
Figure 5.28: VACv2’s Scan Manager module internal structure with WAS Target class
From the highlight present in the image, it is possible to observe that the only change
made to this module was the addition of a new class namedWASTarget that will extend the
TargetObject class. The effort in adding this new scan type made possible to acknowledge
that at this point VACv2 is quite easier to add new scan types. Let’s now get into the detail
of this new WASTarget class.
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WASTarget This class is equivalent to the VMTarget class, meaning it will extend the
TargetObject class.11 Otherwise, the Target class would have to contemplate every
property associated with every single one of the scan types. In other words, that
class would have to suffer a change every time a new scan type was to be added,
something that did not occur in this case.
The purpose of this class is to hold to every property that is required to perform a
WAS scan. This class is composed of three properties, which are the following:
URL Target of the scan, equivalent to the IP addresses in the VMTarget.
CrawlScope This property is intrinsic to WAS scans. It defines the scope of the
scan, e.g., should the scan be executed over the domain, should it only be
executed over specific sub-domains, et cetera.
ApplianceId This property reflects the appliance designated to perform the scan.
Although the association is done in runtime12, in opposition to what happens
with a VM scan, the operator has the final word about which appliance will
perform the scan. The reason why this happens is that some websites may
resolve both to an internal address of PT, as it may resolve externally, so this
provides the power for the user to choose the network appliance where the
website is located case the original suggestion is not the pretended one.
Auxiliary Module - Network Manager
For this objective, and due to the Qualys scanning technology providing WAS scans, it
was needed for this module to resolve an URL to its IP address, and then to associate
it with a network. Image 5.29 presents the structure of the file, which is loaded into
memory by this module. This module achieves this by associating DNS servers with a
custom network. The way it works is by trying to resolve the URL into the IP, if not
successful it will move on until one is successful, if none of the DNS servers determines
the IP address, then it is assumed that the URL provided is on the internet, being external
to PT.
11Quick reminder, the TargetObject class exists with the purpose of detaching VACv2 from being attached
to a scan type.
12By runtime it is meant while the user is still configuring the object of the scan.
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Figure 5.29: VACv2’s Network Manager Boot File
View Manager Module & ClientSide
Every view presented in the previous section showed VACv2 in its final state, in this
section let’s analyze the properties involved with a WAS scan while configuring a scan.
The following illustrations will exemplify the usage when configuring a WAS scan, and
these images will only illustrate the specific WAS properties given that every other option
remains the same.
Before starting, if the reader might recollect figure 5.27, which illustrated the config-
uration of a VM scan in VACv2, what defined that the configuration being done was a
VM scan instead of a WAS scan, was the tab chosen. Let’s now take a look at the Web
Application Security tab.
Figure 5.30: WAS Scan Configuration Tab illustration
Image 5.30 illustrates the tab related to the WAS configuration. Please note that the
Crawl and Appliance options are blocked.
Chapter 5. VACv2 Design & Implementation 86
Figure 5.31: WAS Scan Configuration Tab illustration - First Step
Image 5.31 is now illustrating that after choosing the template, the crawl option gets
unlocked. Every scanning technology may provide its crawling options, that is why the
option is blocked until then because the template is an indirect pointer to the scanning
technology.
Figure 5.32: WAS Scan Configuration Tab illustration - Second Step
Image 5.32 illustrates the available crawling options for the Qualys scanning technol-
ogy. It is possible to infer that is the Qualys technology because at this time only Qualys
has the possibility to perform WAS scans. Otherwise, the user can be aware of the actual
scanning technology when taking a look at the template property.
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Figure 5.33: WAS Scan Configuration Tab illustration - Third Step
Image 5.33 is illustrating the automatical assign of an appliance to perform the scan.
The Appliance field only gets unlocked after choosing the Template option and inserting
the Target URL. It works this way because, we need to know which scanning technology
is going to perform the scan so we can get the networks currently monitored by its appli-
ances, and then the Target URL is needed for the DNS servers to try to resolve it, and this
way associate the URL with an appliance.13
Figure 5.34: WAS Scan Configuration Tab illustration - Fourth Step
Image 5.34 illustrates the available networks where Qualys can perform scans, and
which of the appliances was the suggested for performing the scan.
5.2.3 Results Treating & Data Correlation
This section will describe the third and final objective of this report. This objective could
be split into two phases. The first phase consists of the redesign of VACv2’s Results
Manager module, while the second, in a very high-level detail, would consist on Maltego
getting the scan results which were placed in Hidra.
13This is the illustration of the feature mentioned in the section 5.2.2 Scan Manager Module while de-
scribing the WASTarget class’ ApplianceId property.
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The changes made over the Results Manager module had the intention of providing
the operator control of VACv2’ results. The second part takes place in Maltego - a spe-
cialized software for data correlation -, it will consist in a development over the software,
for Maltego to be able to fetch the results of VACv2 from Hidra. The aim for this “second
phase” is to allow an easier correlation of data, which will from now on, include vulner-
ability scan results. The operator of Maltego is not the same as the operator of VACv2,
Maltego is to be managed by a SOC operator.
Following, this section will have a similar structure to the previous ones, presenting
only the affected modules by the change.
Results Manager Module
This module was not mentioned previously due to having suffered a complete redesign
face what was previously done in VAC, and the reason why is that VAC was not able
to handle any interaction or customization over this module. In fact, the classes that
were used to connect with the DCY’s information systems - designated by integrators -,
contained all the sensitive information belonging to the repositories tangled up with the
coding itself, information like host address, the username or the password.
Figure 5.35: VAC’s Results Manager module internal structure
Figure 5.35 illustrates the architecture of this module over VAC, it is possible to wit-
ness that the ResultManager class had an association with the integrators, restraining to
a one-to-one relationship. It is also possible to recognize that the system was not ready
for handling technologies besides the two that already existed, at least without having a
development. The ResultManager class also stored the events signaled to except in future
scans, this information was kept in an array of ResultException classes. Typically, every
ResultException class represented a false-positive event identified in the scannings.
In VAC, this module used to be triggered through the creation of files that transmitted
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that a scan had just finished, the scan results would be the content of such file. This
module would open that files, load the content into memory and sent the information
directly to the integrators’ classes. The ArcSight and Hidra classes would parse the results
for excepted events, and then upload the results into the information repository. At every
scan, ArcSight and Hidra would perform their routines, meaning the results of every scan
would be contained in these two systems, something not desired.
Let’s now analyze the changes the Results Manager module suffered from the imple-
mentation of the third objective of this project.
Figure 5.36: VACv2’s Results Manager module internal structure
As it is possible to understand just by comparing illustration 5.36 with illustration
5.35, this module has raised quite a bit. The structure that this module now has was based
on the Scanner Manager module, hence the resemblance, e.g., the Scanner Manager mod-
ule’s Technology class vs. the Integrator class, or the ScannerManager module’s Appli-
anceInstance class vs. the IntegratorInstance class. Let’s analyze the classes illustrated in
image 5.36 in more detail.
Integrator Although with a different context, this class aims at the same purpose as
the Technology class in the Scanner Manager module. Its purpose is to recognize
new technologies for the Results Manager module, store them, and to load them as
well as their properties. However, in this case, the technologies recognized will be
related to DCY’s Information Systems. The properties are being mentioned because
they are dynamic, and they will appear in the client-side according to what is stated
in the configuration files.
IntegratorInstance The same happens with this class, with a different context, but this
class aims at the same purpose as the ApplianceInstance class in the Scanner Man-
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ager module. This class’s purpose is to be a single point of unity for the VACv2
software and the classes impersonating the DCY’s Information Systems. This class
will provide a base structure for the classes impersonating the Information Reposi-
tories, ensuring an abstract layer between the ResultManager class and the classes
extending this one, this way strengthening VACv2’s unattachment to any technolo-
gies. This class contains a few properties, but only one is required to be explained,
it is a hash named configurations. What will be stored in that hash are the properties
for the technology that it is impersonating. Ahead, will be an illustration to show
the importance of the properties in the client-side, to make more accessible for the
reader to understand.
Figure 5.37: VACv2’s AlienVault integrator properties
Illustrated in image 5.37 is the configuration belonging to the AlienVault integrator
in VACv2. From it is possible to observe multiple properties and that all follow
a four attributes structure, these attributes have the purpose of instructing VACv2
how to handle the properties. These properties presented in the figure are the ones
that will be stored over the configurations’ hash mentioned previously, along with
its value.
AlienVault, ArcSight & Hidra These classes are the ones that impersonate a DCY’s In-
formation System. They will be extending the IntegratorInstance class and imple-
menting its base structure. Also, they are responsible for using the configurations’
hash which contains the properties each technology requires to achieve a successful
connection to its information repository. Each one of these classes will upload data
according to the format the technology is expecting. From the three classes, Alien-
Vault is the only brand new technology to integrate, but Hidra as suffered changes,
Chapter 5. VACv2 Design & Implementation 91
so we will get into more detail over the way these two upload its values into its
Information System.
AlienVault It was defined that the integrator for AlienVault would upload its results
through Syslog [34], which is a standard for message logging, and would use the
CEF format[47]. CEF stands for Common Event Format, which defines that the
syslog message should contain the following structure:
CEF: Version|Device Vendor|Device Product|Device Version|
Signature ID|Name|Severity|Extension
Ahead, in the Results chapter, there will be an opportunity to view a real event sent
by VACv2 to AlienVault. However, based on the CEF structure, it is possible to say
that the “Extension” field contains all the information related to the event, all the
other fields are related to the software, in this case, it will contain information about
VACv2.
Also, in this integrator, only the Vulnerabilities will be sent to the technology and
one by one, this has much to do with the fact that AlienVault is a SIEM. In other
words, it means that the called “Metadata” stored in the ReportInstance’s summary
property will not be sent to AlienVault.
Hidra As said before, Hidra is a custom solution, and it contains an in-house Ruby library
for uploading values into the system. Hidra is composed of multiple software, but it
is centralized in the ElasticSearch Engine. ElasticSearch uses indexes to store data,
the definition of an index by Elastic is as follows:
“An index is like a table in a relational database. It has a mapping which contains
a type, which contains the fields in the index...” [27]
With this in mind, VACv2 uploads the values of a scan into two indexes, they are
named “scan_event” and “vuln_event”, both with well-defined purposes.
The “scan_event” will contain the called Metadata of the scan, i.e., will contain
information like the number of vulnerabilities found, the average response by the
target, or the total hosts number. Image 5.38 illustrates a table with the fields this
ElasticSearch index will be composed, let’s now see what each column of the table
will provide:
• First column refers to the name of the field in ElasticSearch;
• Second column states with which scan type the property is related;
• Third column details which field of the ReportInstance is responsible for fill-
ing this property. In some cases, the ElasticSearch property can have more
than one field according to the scan type;
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• Fourth column is a brief description of the ReportInstance field.
Figure 5.38: ElasticSearch Index “scan_event” vs. VACv2’s ReportInstance Structure
Let’s now analyze the “scan_vuln” index, which purpose is to contain every event
reported by the scanning technologies. Like the “scan_event”, image 5.39 is illus-
trating a table, which as the same structure as the previous one. However, this table
does not contain the description field, given that the fields present in this table refer
to common fields related to vulnerabilities.
Figure 5.39: ElasticSearch Index “scan_vuln” vs. VACv2’s ReportInstance Structure
Both indexes contain the structure that made the most sense to DCY and the student.
ReportInstance The ReportInstance class is the object that will hold all the information
related to the results of a scan. As there are multiple scanning technologies, and
at least two different scan types, this class must be able to support all the different
reports produced by the technologies. Image 5.40 is illustrating the composition of
the Report Instance object.
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Figure 5.40: ReportInstance Structure
All the fields present in the structure were chosen as being the most “regular” be-
tween technologies. What this intents to achieve, is a way to get VACv2 detached
from any technology, being able to parse any report from any scanning technology.
The creation of this object is done in the classes that extend the ApplianceInstance
class, due to these classes being the ones who will contain the knowledge of how
the results should be mapped into the ReportInstance object.
The ReportInstance is composed of two children objects, let’s have a high-level
analysis of what is pretended from these objects:
Summary This object’s purpose is to contain the information that might be seen
as “Metadata” of the scan, meaning it will contain the name of the scan, how
much time did the scanning take, the targets of the scan, the number of hosts
alive vs. the number of total hosts, the number of vulnerabilities found, and so
on.
Vulnerability This object contains the purpose of carrying the information about
the event and the target where it was found.
There are only two fields that belong to VACv2 and not to any of the scanning
technologies, which are: “Policy” and “PolicyDescription”. Both situated in
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the Vulnerability class, these fields will store the value if the vulnerability has
been excepted or excluded in the VACv2 system, with a brief description from
the user to explain the reason why, respectively.
SimpleVulnerability This class’s purpose is to impersonate a vulnerability of a given
technology. It will store the values that uniquely identify any vulnerability in any
scanning technology, properties like the scanning technology, the identifier of the
vulnerability in the scanning technology, the title of the vulnerability, and so one.
ResultsManager This class is the head of the Results Manager module. Its purpose is
to, in a first instance, manage all the instanciated IntegratorInstance classes, sec-
ondly to parse every scan result, while storing every unique vulnerability from each
technology14, and finally sending the parsed ReportInstance into the correspondent
integrators for uploading the results into the platforms.
This class is composed of the following properties:
• IntegratorsInstance’s hash
• ReportInstance’s Hash - These objects are stored by state, which represent the
phase were the ReportInstance is. E.g., Requesting Report, or Downloading
Report, or Parsing Results, or Uploading Results.
• SimpleVulnerability’s Hash - This property contains every event ever reported
by any scanning technology.
• ExceptedSimpleVulnerability’s Hash - This property will contain every event
which was excepted. This property will point to the SimpleVulnerability ob-
ject which represents the vulnerability and will associate an IP address and a
motive.
• ExcludedSimpleVulnerability’s Hash - This property will contain every event
which was excluded. This property will point to the SimpleVulnerability ob-
ject which represents the vulnerability and will associate a motive.
The ExceptedSimpleVulnerability and ExcludedSimpleVulnerability properties re-
fer to two different actions that might be carried by the operator.
• An excepted event is so when a given event is associated with a target, mean-
ing that it is to be considered as a false-positive. Let’s imagine the following
example: A given target contains the port associated with the FTP protocol
open. However, it is not the FTP service that is active and is one other proto-
col that is secure. The result would be this event being excepted for this target,
for this vulnerability, and in this service/port.
14The vulnerabilities are saved in the SimpleVulnerability object.
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• An excluded event is so when a given event is to be excluded from any scan
configuration, meaning this event does not need to be associated with a target.
The purpose of this action is to if such event is ever found to be ignored despite
the target. Let’s imagine the following example: One scan reported an event
in which the subject common name of the certificate did not match the server
FQDN. If VACv2 were to be only used for scanning internal IP Addresses, and
given that external certificates cannot contain internal addresses, that would
result in the exclusion of this vulnerability from the system.
This module’s normal operation is as follows: In reverse to what used to happen in
VAC, VACv2’s Results Manager module will be triggered by the Scan Manager module.
When a scan reaches its ending, the Scan Manager module will verify if in the scan
configuration it was configured at least one IntegratorInstance identifiers. If so, would
be stored in the integrators property, mentioned in section 5.2.1. For the scans whose
integrators property is not empty, the Scan Manager module will request this module to
take action.
On the Results ManagerModule side, when receiving the request by the ScanManager
module, this module will request the Scanner Manager module to generate a scan report
for that scan. The Results Manager module will track the report generation through in-
quiries to the Scanner Manager module, and when it reaches the end, the Results Manager
module will request the Scanner Manager module to download the report, which will then
interpret the results, map them into a ReportInstance object, and return it to the Results
Manager Module.
When this module gets the ReportInstance object, it will iterate all the results for new
events, and to signal events that might be excepted or excluded. The way it is done is by
setting the “policy” property with the values “excepted” or “excluded” and filling the “pol-
icydescription” value with the information contained in the ExceptedSimpleVulnerability
or ExcludedSimpleVulnerability hash. After the results being checked, the ResultsMan-
ager class will request the upload of the ReportInstance to the Integrators which IDs were
referenced in the ReportInstance’s Technologies15 array.
Scan Manager Module
At this point, this module is here to explain a single feature that was already shown but not
explained at the time. If the reader might recall figure 5.25, which consisted of the illus-
tration of a scan configuration, available in section 5.2.1, while analyzing the differences
made in the client-side over the first objective of this project - Improvement of VAC. The
integrators property of the ScanInfo object carries the purpose of containing the chosen
integrators, which point to the DCY’s Information Repositories where the scan results are
15The technologies in this context are a reference to the integrators.
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to be upload. The values contained in this array will be the ResultsManager’s integrators
Ids.
View Manager Module & ClientSide
This section will reveal the modifications done over the client-side while in the scope of
the third objective of this project. For the data related to the Results Manager module to
get to the client-side, an association between this module and the View Manager had to
be made, similarly to the other modules already illustrated in figure 5.10.
Image 5.41 will illustrate the page related to the Results Manager module view in the
client-side of VACv2, and there we can see the available integrators, which are loaded
once the Results Manager module recognizes them.
Figure 5.41: Integrators Management
Let’s analyze the three highlights in the image:
One Exemplifies the integrator for the AlienVault technology. From this row, it is possi-
ble to view that the technology is “enabled” and “processing”.
Two Pretends to explain the technology state for the different states of the button avail-
able:
• Button “Activate” - This means that the technology is currently disabled and
not configured. In this state, the user is not allowed to change any configura-
tion to this technology. In fact, the Configuration button is locked.
• Button “Deactivate” - This means that the technology is currently enabled,
which will allow the configuration of the technology. When the operator
presses this button, this will trigger not only the deactivation of the technology
but will also erase all configurations associated with the technology.
Three Pretends to demonstrate the different “processing” states associated with a tech-
nology:
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• Configuration button locked - The technology is deactivated, and has to be
activated before being possible to associate it with a configuration16.
• Configuration button with Resume button - VACv2 will only allow the opera-
tor to click the resume button when the configuration is set.
The resume button is what will manifest that the technology is now ready to
use. In more detail, only when this button is clicked is that this integrator will
start appearing in the scan configuration page.
• Configuration button with Pause button - This means that the technology is
active, configured and currently running. Only the technologies with this state
will be shown in the scan configuration page.
Illustration 5.42 is a clip of illustration 5.25 - previously shown -, it is illustrating
the active, configured and currently running integrators. In this image, the user must
select or deselect according to where the scan results are to be uploaded. The illustration
only presents two integrators, which if the reader might recall were the same as the ones
running, as shown in illustration 5.41.
Figure 5.42: Scan Configuration Integrator’s property
Figure 5.43: AlienVault Integrator properties
Figure 5.43 is illustrating the configuration of the AlienVault technology in the client-
side. This configuration was shown with the purpose of enlightening the reader on how
16Illustration 5.41 contains the Maltego technology for demonstration purposes only, and the row is
currently in this state.
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VACv2 will handle the integrator’s properties, this illustration is the client-side associated
with the figure 5.37 previously shown. It is possible to observe that the configuration file,
which defines the properties, is also defining how the properties will be presented in the
client-side, from the property type to the tooltip, or even if they are mandatory or not.
Maltego
As already mentioned, the original intent for Maltego proved to be unfeasible due to soft-
ware compatibility problems. The solution to the problem was to make VACv2 upload the
results to Hidra, and then make Maltego fetch the results from this information repository.
For this solution to work, Maltego has to fetch the pretended scan results, from Elas-
ticSearch with resort to its API. As at the time, Maltego did not offer any support for
the Ruby programming language, Ruby had to be set aside. The chosen language was
one of the suggested by Paterva - creators of Maltego -, Python[31]. Python also had a
framework, named Canari[23], developed explicitly for creating Maltego transforms17.
So it was decided that this “second phase” of the third objective was going to be
developed in Python programming language, version 2.7. To retrieve any information
from ElasticSearch, it was required the implementation of a custom library for handling
the connection and the searches over this platform. It was achieved through the use of
ElasticSearch’s API, and a custom library developed for the purpose was named Elas-
ticConnector. Image 5.44 illustrates the association of the ElasticConnector with the re-
maining classes.
Figure 5.44: Maltego Transforms structure
Illustration 5.44 is presenting the ElasticConnector library, associated with some other
entities, which represent Maltego transforms. As there are about thirty-eight transforms
these were omitted from the image.
When starting the development of the Maltego’s transforms, it was noticed that the
default entities that already existed in the software were not enough to represent the scans’
data. The alternative was to created custom entities. Image 5.45 presents all the entities
created for this purpose.
17A transform can be seen as a procedure/ method in any other language.
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Figure 5.45: Maltego custom entities for handling VACv2 data.
Besides the entities presented in the previous illustration, there is one more belonging
to Maltego which was used, named IPv4 Address. Next, it will be described the purpose
of each of these entities.
IPv4 Address - Represents a simple IPv4Address with no attachments.
VM/WAS Scan Group - It represents a scan configuration on VACv2.
VM/WAS Scan - Represents an instance of a scan configuration.
Target IPv4 Address - This entity represents an IPv4 address that is associated with a
VM Scan entity.
Vulnerable Service - This entity represents a service which was reported in the scanning
technology and is associated with an IPv4 Address or a Target IPv4 Address.
VM Vulnerability - This entity pretends to represent a potential vulnerability or a real
vulnerability associated with a Vulnerable Service.
VM Information Gathered - Because Information Gathered events usually are not that
relevant, they are in a separate entity to allow an easier data manipulation. They
are associated with a Vulnerable Service entity, typically is the one containing the
value “N/A”.
VM Classification - This entity will represent a CVE associated with a VM Vulnerabil-
ity.
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Target URL - This entity is similar to the Target IPv4 Address in the VM context. How-
ever, as in the WAS scans we do not scan an IP address but URLs, this will be the
targeted URL.
Vulnerable URL - This entity is similar to the Vulnerable Service in the VM context.
However, when performing a WAS scan, the URL contained by this entity will be
the vulnerable one.
WAS Vulnerability - Equal to the VM Vulnerability with the difference that it applies to
a Vulnerable URL.
WAS Information Gathered - Equal to the VM Information Gathered with the differ-
ence that it applies to a Vulnerable URL.
WAS Classification - This entity will represent a CWE associated with a WAS Vulnera-
bility.
After analyzing the entities and their purpose let’s move onto the developed trans-
forms. There will be a brief description of every one of the transforms contained in illus-
tration 5.46. A transform contains a signature like methods in programming languages,
and will only show when at the correct input entity.
Figure 5.46: Maltego transforms concerning VM Scans.
Get Last Scan - The input for this transform is the IPv4 Address entity. This transform
will search for the most recent VM Scan where this IP address has been one of the
targets.
Get Most Recent Vulnerable Services - The input for this transform is the IPv4 Ad-
dress. This transform will search for the most recent Vulnerable Services associated
with the IPv4 address input entity.
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IP to URL - The input for this transform is the IPv4 Address. This transform will try to
find if there is a match between the IPv4 address input entity and a Target URLs by
the WAS scans.18
Retrieve Scan Groups - The input for this transform is the IPv4 Address. This transform
will search for every VM Scan Group where the IPv4 address input entity is or were
a target.
Get Scan - The input for this transform is the Target IPv4 Address. This transform will
retrieve the VM Scan associated with the Target IPv4 Address19.
Get Scan Groups - The input for this transform is the Target IPv4 Address. This trans-
form will retrieve all the VM Scan Groups where this IP address is part of its targets.
Get Vulnerable Services - The input for this transform is the Target IPv4 Address. This
transform will retrieve all the Vulnerable Services reported in the VM Scan associ-
ated with this IPv4 Address.
Target to URL - The input for this transform is the Target IPv4 Address. This transform
will try to find a match in the WAS scans’ results where the Target URL resolves to
the same IPv4 Address.
Get Vulnerability - The input for this transform is the VMClassification. This transform
will retrieve the VM Vulnerability associated with it.
Get Scan Group - The input for this transform is the VM Scan. This transform will
retrieve the VM Scan Group associated with this VM Scan.
Get Targets - The input for this transform is the VM Scan. This transform will retrieve
all the Target IPv4 Addresses configured in this VM Scan.
Get All Targets - The input for this transform is the VM Scan Group. This transform
will retrieve all the IPv4 Addresses that were ever associated with this VM Scan
Group.
Get Scans - The input for this transform is the VM Scan Group. This transform will
retrieve all the VM Scans that have occurred belonging to this VM Scan Group.
Get Classification - The input for this transform is the VM Vulnerability. This transform
will retrieve the VM Classification associated with this VM Vulnerability.
18This is possible thanks to ElasticSearch index “scan_event”, which in case of the WAS scans, saves in
two properties the URL and the matching IP address.
19Entities can have properties in Maltego, and it is the case of Target IPv4 Address. This entity contains
a property that stores the scan instance name.
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Get Vulnerable Service - The input for this transform is the VM Vulnerability. This
transform will retrieve the Vulnerable Service associated with this VM Vulnerabil-
ity.
Get Vulnerable Targets - The input for this transform is the VM Vulnerability. This
transform will retrieve all the Target IPv4 Addresses where this vulnerability was
reported.
Get Information Gathered - The input for this transform is the Vulnerable Service. This
transform will retrieve the Information Gathered associated with the Vulnerable
Service. This transform usually is applied to a specific Vulnerable Service entity,
and the entity is identifiable by the value it contains, which is “N/A”.
Get Vulnerabilities - The input for this transform is the Vulnerable Service. This trans-
form will retrieve all the VMVulnerabilities associated with this Vulnerable Service
according to the VM Scan that it is associated.
Retrieve Vulnerable Targets - The input for this transform is the Vulnerable Service.
This transform will retrieve all the Targets IPv4 Addresses where this service had
been reported.
Image 5.47 will illustrate the developed transforms that apply to the WAS scans.
Figure 5.47: Maltego transforms concerning WAS Scans.
Given the similarity between the ones illustrated in image 5.47 and the previous just
described, these will not be further analyzed.
Images 5.48a and 5.48b are an example of how the transforms are presented, and that
different transforms appear to different entities.
Image 5.49 presents an example of the Maltego, with a graph generated from VACv2’s
data.
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(a) Target IPv4 Address Entity transforms
(b) IPv4 Address Entity transforms
Figure 5.48: Example of different transforms for different entities.
Figure 5.49: Maltego Graph Demonstration.
In illustration 5.49, it is possible to see that the graph was originated in the IPv4
Address entity where it was applied the Get Last Scan transform. The result generated
an association between the input entity and the result, a VM Scan entity. The description
next to the grey arrows declare the transform that has been applied, and the point of
the arrows present the result of that transform. Except for the orange and red arrows,
which symbolize a potential vulnerability or a confirmed vulnerability, respectively, these
associations are the result of the Get Vulnerabilities transform.
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5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, the reader has just witnessed the final architecture of VACv2. This master
thesis was divided into three implementation phases to match the objectives, and which
purpose was to improve the in-house software named VAC.
The first goal was the overall improvement of the software, and it was without any
doubt the most crucial of three objectives, this one was what allowed a smooth imple-
mentation of the remaining goals. This goal restructured VAC completely, it set straight
the purpose of each block in the solution. It was thought to ease the addition of new tech-
nologies, and to provide VACv2’s operator with more usability and power of the tool. One
essential achievement was the layer of protection added to VACv2. From the secure com-
munication between client and server to the authentication of the User against PT’s Active
Directory through Kerberos Authentication protocol. From the users allowed to access the
software, to the cookie-based session. All these enforce security to the solution, which
handles sensitive information, i.e., vulnerabilities belonging to essential targets.
The second goal was much smoother considering the whole re-design of VAC into
VACv2. The solution becoming unattached from any scanning technologies, made all the
necessary development be the creation of a new class which had to extend the Appliance-
Instance class, and that was it.
However, as the scanning technology did not offer a ruby library, a custom had to be
developed. This second goal consisted of the addition of the Qualys Cloud-Based technol-
ogy into the solution, but this technology contained some special perks when comparing
with the others. The first is the fact that it is a Security as a Service (SECaaS) and PT
does not manage the solution directly, something that did not occur with the other tech-
nologies and VACv2 had to be capable of handling it. The other feature was the fact that
this technology contained a Web Application Scanning module, something that VAC was
not capable of handling. However, like said before, the first goal of this master thesis was
supposed to allow a more natural addition of new technologies into the system, and also to
contemplate the possibility of having more than one scan type, easing the implementation
of the second phase.
The third and last goal consisted of a full restructure of the Results Module, which
in VAC due to the lack of time, was set aside, not providing any control to the operator
about the data to be uploaded or the systems in which VACwas integrating. The result was
what was developed in VACv2, turning this module pretty similar to the Scanner Man-
ager module with the concern of easing the upload of data into new technologies. While
also providing control over the platforms in which VACv2 will be integrating with, and
allowing more natural vulnerability management concerning the exception and exclusion
of events.
The redevelopment of this module had another feature which was a specialized de-
velopment for the Maltego technology, which is a correlation data software. PT had full
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interest in including the results provided by VACv2 on this platform, which will provide
more information to the SOC team which are the typical users of this software.
The end of this additional development also ended the development phase of this
project.

Chapter 6
Results
In the past two chapters, we have analyzed the objective, design, and development for the
Continuous Security Assessment project. More specifically, chapter four depicted what
the objectives were for the project. While chapter five described VAC software, as it was
at the beginning of this project, and then described the new architecture, the ideas behind
every implementation, the changes made, and so on.
VAC was the result of a thesis previous to this one. However, the software never made
it to a production environment. The main reason was that PT did not renew its contract
with Rapid7 concerning Nexpose. In other words, there is no real base of comparison on
how to evaluate VACv2.
This thesis comes to release DCY’s personnel from having to concern with vulnera-
bility scans, and to allow a more natural data correlation of the vulnerabilities found in
the assessed platforms, which otherwise would consist of intensive labors. This project
through the use of VACv2 was made to help in the prevention and mitigation of possible
malicious attacks. While also contributing with its results to a DCY more aware of the
current problems, and allowing a more accurate and faster data correlation. It was sug-
gested to present a quiz in this section of the report, but as there was only one person in
charge of the vulnerability scans in PT, it would not bring that much value into the report.
This chapter illustrates, two recurrent procedures carried out by the DCY operator
when handling scanning technologies, and these procedures will be illustrated for both
Nexpose as Qualys. Afterward, we will evaluate the corresponding procedures in VACv2
software and verify potential gains vs. drawbacks. The procedures being analyzed will be
the scan configuration and the report configuration.
6.1 Nexpose
6.1.1 Scan Configuration: Required Steps
Let’s now analyze the necessary steps for setting up a scan in Rapid7’s Nexpose.
For a scan to be set up, first the assets have to be configured in the platform. However,
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the assets have to be arranged by network first. Nexpose contains an object, named Site,
and this objective is responsible for aggregating the assets.
As PT contains multiple subnetworks, if the arrangement by network was not made,
then only the assets configured in the same network as the appliance responsible for per-
forming the scan would return results, and all the others would be wrongly considered
as dead hosts. In worse case scenario there will be as many Sites as internal networks,
meaning this procedure would have to be executed multiple times.
Figure 6.1: Nexpose Scan Configuration Step 1 - Identifier of the Site Object.
Screen 6.1 is illustrating the first page when configuring a Site object in Nexpose, and
it will store the information related to a set of assets. The Name property is what identifies
the Site.
Figure 6.2: Nexpose Scan Configuration Step 2 - Declaring the IP Addresses of the
targets of the scan.
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Screen 6.2 is illustrating the page where the assets are to be configured.
Figure 6.3: Nexpose Scan Configuration Step 3 - Choosing the scan template.
Screen 6.3 is illustrating the page where the template is chosen.
Figure 6.4: Nexpose Scan Configuration Step 4 - Associating the Site object with an
Appliance.
Screen 6.4 is illustrating the page where the association between the assets and the ap-
pliance to perform the scan is done, thence the assets being group by IP address, because
the ones contained in this Site have to be in the same internal network as the appliance
chosen. At this point, the site will be assigned to an appliance.
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Figure 6.5: Nexpose Scan Configuration Step 5 - Enabling notifications.
Screen 6.5 is illustrating the page where the notifications are configured. The notifi-
cations might be sent accordingly to the actual scan state, or the type of event discovered.
Figure 6.6: Nexpose Scan Configuration Step 6 - Configuring the scan recurrence.
Screen 6.6 is illustrating the page where the recurrence of the scan is determined.
A typical platform belonging by PT contains assets in multiple networks, which means
that there has to be the need to create as many Sites as the number of different networks in
that platform. The problem lies in the next step, Nexpose does not allow to aggregated this
Site objects, meaning all the assets will run a different scan, in other words, if the scanning
schedule ever needed to be changed then every Site would also have to be altered.
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6.1.2 Report Generation: Required Steps
After a scan occurrence, the DCY operator needs to extract the results from the platform,
and this is done through the generation of a report, which will be illustrated next.
Figure 6.7: Nexpose Report Configuration.
Screen 6.7 is illustrating where the report generation is configured. We will now
analyze the properties associated with the report configuration.
• Template property is the blueprint for the report to be generated, in other words, it
will define what types of vulnerabilities should be presented, or which graphics to
show in the report, among a lot of other options.
• File property will define the type of report to be generated. DCY always works with
two types, a CSV file, and a PDF file.
• Scope property represents what should be the focus of the report, i.e., scans or Sites.
The difference, between these, a scan report will focus on the difference from the
previous scan to the actual one, while a site report will focus on the state of the
assets in the previous scan vs. the actual one.
• Frequency property, which turned out pretty handy because as the illustration shows,
it is possible to set the frequency of the report for whenever the associated Scan or
Site is scanned.
As DCY operates with two file types of the same report - CSV and PDF -, this means
that this procedure has to be set up twice. However, there is no need of coming back to
these configurations, unless it is intended to make a significant change to the report, e.g.,
set a new template or file format. Even if the scan is canceled, thanks to the frequency
property there is no need to come back to the report configuration.
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6.2 Qualys
6.2.1 Scan Configuration: Required Steps
Qualys’s scan configuration is pretty similar to the Nexpose’s one. However, it has a few
teaks. When setting up a scan, the IP addresses have to be previously stated into the
Qualys platform. Otherwise, Qualys’s platform refuses to scan the asset.
Qualys aggregates assets, which have to be arranged by a network, the object is named
AssetGroup but contains a similar purpose to Nexpose’s Site.
In Qualys, there has to exist as many AssetGroup as there are networks. The Asset-
Group can be assigned to a given appliance, and that appliance will be the one to perform
the scan. Qualys contains a Scan object which will contain the scan configuration. Is part
of the scan configuration, to state the AssetGroup that have to be scanned, meaning that,
in reverse to what happened in Nexpose, Qualys only needs to launch one scan and all the
associated AssetGroups will be scanned despite their networks, thanks to the AssetGroups
being associated with its correspondent appliance.
Figure 6.8: Qualys Scan Configuration Step 1 - Declaration of the targeted IP Addresses
in the platform.
Screen 6.8 is illustrating the page where the target’s addresses have to be stated. Oth-
erwise, Qualys refuses to perform the scan.
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Figure 6.9: Qualys Scan Configuration Step 2 - Creation of an AssetGroup, which will
aggregate the targeted IP Addresses to a scanning appliance, both must be in the same
network.
Screen 6.9 is illustrating the page where the AssetGroup object is created, the next
tabs will not be illustrated, but they will be described.
Asset Group Title Tab where the name of the Asset Group is stated.
IPs Tab where the IPs related to this AssetGroup are stated.
Scanner Appliance Operator assigns an appliance to the AssetGroup. The appliance is
responsible for scanning a given network, “demanding” the AssetGroup only to
contain IP Addresses located in that network. Any IP Address contained in the
AssetGroup that is not included in that network might be wrongly considered as a
dead host.
Figure 6.10: Qualys Scan Configuration Step 3 - Creation of a Scan Configuration.
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Screen 6.10 is illustrating the first page when configuring a scan in Qualys. In this
page, is set the title that identifies the scan configuration. Also, it is the place where
the scan template is chosen, which in Qualys, the property is named as “Option Profile”.
Another property is the “Scanner Appliance”, which will allow the operator to override
the Scanner Appliance assigned to the AssetGroups using the defined in the property
instead. To use the appliances already associated with the AssetGroups it only needs to
set the value “Default”, as it was displayed.
Figure 6.11: Qualys Scan Configuration Step 4 - Association of the Scan Configuration
object with the AssetGroups.
Screen 6.11 is illustrating the place where the AssetGroups are to be defined.
Figure 6.12: Qualys Scan Configuration Step 1 - Declaration of the Scan Configuration
recurrence.
Screen 6.12 is illustrating the place where it is configured the scan recurrence.
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Figure 6.13: Qualys Scan Configuration Step 1 - Enabling notifications.
Screen 6.13 is illustrating the place where the notifications about the scan are con-
figured. In Qualys, there is an object called Distribution Lists which aggregates emails,
meaning that the emails contained in the selected Distribution Lists will get notified. Also,
it is possible to customize the notifications to be sent.
From what we have seen, Qualys offers the possibility of performing one scan over all
the associated Asset Groups or to performing a scan by Asset Group. This is left to the
operator’s choice.
The procedure illustrated above is an illustration of the Vulnerability Management
scan type, the Web Application Scanning is similar. Therefore the WAS scan configura-
tion will not be illustrated.
6.2.2 Report Generation: Required Steps
Figure 6.14 illustrates the page where the report generation is configured in Qualys. Like
in Nexpose, here the “Report Template” property also represents the guidelines for the
creation of the report.
Figure 6.14: Qualys Report Configuration.
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In screen 6.14, exists two differences when comparing it with Nexpose. The first is
the Scheduling type, which is one of the most significant setbacks of Qualys concerning
the effect on the work of the DCY’s operator.
In Qualys, a Report has to be scheduled just like a scan, and can be not associated with
the scan task, meaning that there is a need of being confident that the scan has already
finished for obtaining the correct results. Otherwise, if the scan is still running and the
report starts running, it will fetch the previous scan returning deprecated results.
The second difference is the Notification area, which although not displayed, in case
of the property being checked it would behave as the scan notification. It will provide the
operator with the power of choosing the Distribution Groups to be notified, and also the
possibility of customizing the notification.
The remaining properties are pretty straightforward and self-explanatory. The title
is the property which unequivocally identifies the report. The report format property is
the format for the report to be generated. The Report Source is the target for the report.
Qualys’ reports contain the same problem as the Nexpose’s ones, which is the need of
having to configure two reports for a scan - one in PDF and the other in CSV.
The WAS Report contains the same structure as the VM report, meaning it will not be
illustrated.
6.3 VACv2
6.3.1 Scan Configuration: Required Steps
Although already shown in previous chapters, let’s now appreciate the simpleness asso-
ciated with the configuration of a scan in VACv2, illustrating both scan types, VM and
WAS.
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Figure 6.15: VACv2 Scan configuration page.
Screen 6.15 is illustrating the place where the scans are configured in VACv2 - VM
and WAS, highlighted in blue and green, respectively. In this page, it is possible to pin-
point almost if not all the properties that were analyzed in the previous sections regarding
Nexpose and Qualys.
At first glance, the user-friendly interface provided by VACv2 offers the user a more
comfortable experience, and in general, makes VACv2 easier to understand and operate.
Let’s analyze the fields displayed in illustration 6.15:
Id The name of the scan configuration.
Recurrence Defines the recurrence of the scan. Accordingly, to the chosen option, it will
present more or fewer fields to fulfill.
Scan type Chosen by selecting the correspondent tab. Will present the properties associ-
ated with the scan type. Independently of the scan type, the user will always have
to fill the critical and template options.
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• When the user chooses the VM scan, highlighted in blue, it will have to fill in
all the targets of the scan in the Asset List table.1
• If the user chooses the WAS scan, highlighted in green, when inserting the
Target URL, VACv2 will automatically recommend an appliance to perform
the scan, which will be presented to the operator in the “Appliance” field. In
reverse to what happened in the VM scan, the operator can supersede this
option by selecting the appliance himself. Besides these two fields, there is
one more field that needs to be configured which is the “Crawl” option, that
will define the length of the scan. This property will set the limits for the scan,
i.e., will define if the appliance should scan everything below the URL or a
specific sub-domain.
Integrators This property is optional, but if defined, it will determine the DCY’s infor-
mation repositories where the results should be uploaded.
Email Alerts This last configuration is optional and can be divided into two sections.
The first will only activate notifications regarding the scan, by determining which
scan states should generate a notification and to which Mailing List should the no-
tifications be sent. The “Custom Email Contents” section will allow the operator to
customize the title or the message to be sent in the notifications that will be sent to
the distribution list. Under the attachments area, the attachments B.1, and B.2 rep-
resent a notification of the starting of a scan, and the ending of a scan respectively.
6.3.2 Report Generation: Required Steps
In VACv2, there is no concern with the report generation related to the scan event. It
is an action that can be automatically be triggered when the scan is finished. There are
two possible behaviors concerning the reports, the first - considered to be more often-
will occur when choosing one or more integrators while configuring the scan. In this
case, the report will be triggered, and the results will be uploaded into the corresponding
information repositories, but only after the results are treated by VACv2. The second
alternative is when no integrator is selected, in this case, the Scan Manager module will
not trigger the Results Manager module, not generating any report. The DCY operator
is able to access the scanning platform and produce a report at any time. The scans that
might occur under these conditions are considered one time only scans.
VACv2 will generate the two reports handled by DCY - CSV, and PDF. The objective
of the CSV report is for VACv2 to be able to treat the results, and the PDF will be avail-
1The user has to insert all the targets without having to worry if the IP addresses were already declared
in the scanning platform, or about their networks. VACv2 will automatically declare the IP addresses in the
scanning platform, and group them by network, assigning them the corresponding appliance to perform the
scan.
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able for the user to download from the Hidra information repository, but only when this
integrator gets checked.
6.4 Nexpose and Qualys vs. VACv2
Now, after examining the regular procedure performed by the DCY operator in Nexpose,
Qualys, and VACv2, we are ready to analyze the differences between the different plat-
forms. Regarding the configuration of a scan, it was possible to witness the increased
difficulty of doing so in a scanning technology vs. configuring one in VACv2. From the
insertion of the IP Addresses/ URL to the report configuration, but that was precisely
what was intended from VACv2, to automize and optimize the vulnerability management
procedures performed by DCY. VACv2 aimed to be a centralized platform for manag-
ing scans, and this goal has some strings attached. When configuring a scan in VACv2,
is pretty easy to change the scanning technology in charge of the scan. To make this
happen, all the operator needs to change is the combination of the critical and template
properties, this because VACv2 takes control of the scheduling instead of the scanning
technologies. In reverse, if a scan was configured in a scanning technology, and if there
were the need to change the scan to a different scanning technology, the operator would
have to go the platform where the scan was initially configured, delete that configuration,
and then recreate the scan in the new scanning platform, which is a procedure that might
occur with some frequency.
The reason why this procedure might be frequent is that purchased scanning technolo-
gies have licensing limits, and PT contains thousands of IP addresses which if all had to
be configured in a paid platform the costs would be unbearable. Meaning the manage-
ment of the “slots” in this type of platforms is sensitive and has to be managed carefully.
The operator has to prioritize the assets and configured them in the platform he finds to
be more fitted given its criticality. However, PT is a company in which new assets appear
almost every day, meaning the reassessment is a regular procedure.
VACv2 is also responsible for managing the assets, in other words, VACv2 inserts
the assets into the scanning technologies before a scan and removes them when the scan
finishes, this takes the load out of DCY of this terribly laborious task, while also providing
more efficient use of the paid technologies.
Another example, PT acquired Qualys and stopped using Nexpose, all the scans con-
figured in Nexpose had to be reconfigured in Qualys. In VACv2, the required procedure
was only editing the scan and changing the Template property to one belonging to Qualys.
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6.5 Information Systems
There are three Information Systems available in VACv2’s Results Manager module -
AlienVault, ArcSight, and Hidra -, although only two are currently active, AlienVault and
Hidra. ArcSight is not active because PT decided it that way. Maltego, previously shown,
was for demonstration purposes only.
Maltego was already illustrated in section 5.2.3 with a real case, so it will not be
referenced again. So in the following section, we will be analyzing AlienVault and Hidra.
6.5.1 Hidra
When VAC was built, it was ready to upload the scan results to Hidra. The events were
to be uploaded with Nexpose’s format, OpenVAS results would have to be changed to
Nexpose’s format for being uploaded into the platform. We have already seen the format
of the events that are being uploaded from VACv2 into Hidra, which are technology in-
dependent. However, as it never got to the production environment, there is no base of
comparison of the data sent by VAC vs. VACv2. Under the attachments area, it will be
possible to observe four examples of events uploaded into Hidra, one for each index by
scan type:
B.3 Illustrates one event contained in the “scan_event” index, which is referent to a VM
scan type. The “action_result_attachment” was shrunken in order to minimize the
illustration.
B.4 Illustrates one event contained in the “scan_vuln” index, which is referent to a VM
scan type.
B.5 Illustrates one event contained in the “scan_event” index, which is referent to a WAS
scan type. The “action_result_attachment” was shrunken in order to minimize the
illustration.
B.6 Illustrates one event contained in the “scan_vuln” index, which is referent to a WAS
scan type.
It is through the data available in this information system, and because it is aware of
the structure of both indexes, that Maltego is able to fetch the data in this information
repository, and to correlate it, presenting it then to the Maltego operator.
6.5.2 AlienVault
As previously said, VACv2’s AlienVault integrator uses the syslog protocol with the CEF
format to upload its values into AlienVault USM. Next, it will be exemplified an event
uploaded into the SIEM.
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Nov 3 14:50:58 openvas CEF:0|DCY|VAC|2|838669|VAC-SCAN-VM
Teste Scan #2-2017-11-03::14:50:45|6|source=Qualys|
scan_type=VM|vuln_title=SSL/TLS Server supports TLSv1.0|
vuln_id=38628|vuln_type=Vuln|vuln_target=XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX|
vuln_policy=Excluded|vuln_policy\_description=Exclusão
exemplo.|vuln_category=General remote services|
vuln_protocol=tcp|vuln_port=443|vuln_service=http over
ssl|vuln_cve=|vuln_os_cpe=|vuln_pci=1|vuln_exploit=””|
vuln_malware=””|vuln_refs=””|vuln_status=”Active”|
vuln_result=”TLSv1.0 is supported”|vuln_threat=”TLS is
capable of using a multitude of ciphers (algorithms) to
create the public and private key pairs. For example if
TLSv1.0 uses either the RC4 stream cipher, or a block
cipher in CBC mode. RC4 is known to have biases and the
block cipher in CBC mode is vulnerable to the POODLE
attack. TLSv1.0, if configured to use the same cipher
suites as SSLv3, includes a means by which a TLS
implementation can downgrade the connection to SSL v3.0,
thus weakening security. A POODLE-type attack could also
be launched directly at TLS without negotiating a
downgrade. This QID will be marked as a Fail for PCI as
of May 1st, 2017 in accordance with the new standards.
For existing implementations, Merchants will be able to
submit a PCI False Positive / Exception Request and
provide proof of their Risk Mitigation and Migration
Plan, which will result in a pass for PCI up until June
30th, 2018.”
From the previous example, it is possible to understand how a message is uploaded
with the CEF format, previously analyzed. It might seem confusing, but this is because
of the extension property of CEF’s format, which is responsible for carrying the actual
message. In the example, the content of the extension property is also split by the pipe
symbol (|), which means that the extension field starts at the “source” property.
The events uploaded are strictly vulnerability events. In other words, the contents of
the ElasticSearch’s index “scan_event” will not be sent, because SIEMs only care about
events itself and not other pieces of information.
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6.6 Conclusion
VACv2 has no base of comparison to any other software because VAC was not deployed
in a production environment, and also because VACv2 came to mitigate a problem for
PT which no other software attempts to, the management of assets/scans cross multiple
scanning platforms. No quiz was made because only one person handled the vulnerabil-
ity assessment routines in DCY. However, it is possible to compare procedures between
software. The procedures that DCY personnel had to perform and that VACv2 come to re-
lieve. Also, the new vulnerability’s data available in the DCY’s information repositories,
which is now possible to correlate with other sources of information.
This chapter demonstrated the complexity of performing two procedures in the scan-
ning platforms - scan configuration and report configuration - vs. making the equivalent
procedures in VACv2. It was illustrated the simplicity behind VACv2’s solution, and al-
though the scanning technologies offered more options, VACv2 provided the standard
features used by DCY.
Besides these points which were the primary focus of this project - the optimization
of periodical scannings and a central point of scan management to relieve DCY personnel
- this project also improved the results produced. VAC used the output format provided
by Nexpose to upload its values into ArcSight and Hidra. As in VACv2, this structure
has been revisited, by changing the original structure outputted - which was only ready to
handle VM results - it is now possible to send values to more systems, which is the case of
AlienVault. Also, the fact that information is getting to Maltego for correlation analysis
-a brand new feature -, which will allow a more natural correlation of the data produced
by the scanning technologies and other information repositories.
Chapter 7
Conclusion & Future Work
Given the urge for companies to protect themselves from potential attacks that might come
to incur, the run for discovering vulnerabilities in their perimeter and inside is a must. To
achieve this goal, there are a diversity of companies which their focus is to offer tools
specialized in vulnerability management.
PT is one of the biggest telecommunications corporations in Portugal, for that reason it
needs a good cybersecurity team with robust procedures for preventing potential attacks,
and for that reason acquired vulnerability management tools. However, the procedures
associated with the configuration of such tools, and given the size of PT, it would turn into
an unbearable task of maintaining the assets updated in such tools. The limited time of the
DCY - PT’s Direction of CyberSecurity and Privacy - which are the ones responsible for
performing these operations of vulnerability discovery and management, would suffer a
considerable impact. The alternative to reducing DCY’s required time in these operations
while also improving the efficiency of the tools was to build a software. That software
would become a central point for coordination and management of scans to PT, and it was
named Vulnerability Assessment Coordinator - VAC.
VAC was the final product of a master thesis. It was designed to work in a specific
scenario with specific tools. However, two factors sent VAC back to the shelve. One was
the handling of the tool. It was not user-friendly and did not have the capacity for dealing
with errors, which as it turned out demanding even more time from DCY than the original
vulnerability management tools. The second factor was the scenario for which VAC was
designed getting changed. These two circumstances determined the depreciation of the
tool.
Nonetheless, PT did not forfeit of this project, for two reasons, the fact that they had
spent financial and technical resources on VAC, and the second reason was because DCY
continued to have a problem between hands, which was the necessary time for perform-
ing vulnerability management operations, these two circumstances lead to a new master
thesis. VAC had potential, and PT decided to do a new master thesis - the Continuous Se-
curity Assessment thesis -, which would consist in an improvement over VAC, while also
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expanding its scope to endure despite the technologies involved or even if the scenario
might get changed.
VACv2 - which is VAC version two - development consisted in improving the usability
and the security of the tool, while also making it unattached to any scanning technology,
scanning type or results’ platform. This master thesis would even reuse the data of the
scans uploaded into Hidra - an information repository belonging to PT-, and made a spe-
cialized correlation data software - Maltego- download that information for improving the
work of other teams like the SOC team.
There are multiple ways for this tool to keep evolving in the future. VACv2 handles
the scan configurations as being the aggregators of the platforms, could be possibly easier
to manage if there was an actual Asset Group module, where the assets would be con-
figured, and the scans would have an association to them. Another possible work for the
future is related to the configuration of a scan. Now, after understanding the complexity
of performing vulnerability scans, it is easy to understand the importance of performing
authenticated scans, these types of scans improve the level of confidence on the vulnera-
bilities reported by the scanning tools. The work would be about developing an extension
in the scan configuration to allow the insertion of credentials associated with the assets.
One last thing that comes to mind is the possibility of allowing the scans reports to be
generated at all times by the scanning technologies - and not only when an integrator is
chosen -, and then stored in VACv2.
Appendix A
VAC Interface Module
A.0.1 Scheduler Related
Figure A.1: Scheduler View
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Figure A.2: Scheduler Configuration’s Properties
Figure A.3: Configure New Periodic Scan
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A.0.2 Scanner Related
Figure A.4: Scanner View
Figure A.5: Add Scanner Configuration
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A.0.3 Results Related
Figure A.6: Template View (Expanded)
Figure A.7: Configure New Template
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Figure A.8: Processor View
Figure A.9: Results Manager Configuration’s Properties
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Figure A.10: Exception View (Expanded)
Figure A.11: Configure New Exception
Appendix B
VACv2
B.0.1 Email Notifications Examplified
Figure B.1: Start scan action notification example.
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Figure B.2: End scan action notification example.
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B.0.2 Hidra Information Repository structure
B.0.3 VM Scan Type Examples
Figure B.3: ElasticSearch’s scan_event example for VM scan type
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Figure B.4: ElasticSearch’s scan_vuln example for VM scan type
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B.0.4 WAS Scan Type Examples
Figure B.5: ElasticSearch’s scan_event example for WAS scan type
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Figure B.6: ElasticSearch’s scan_vuln example for WAS scan type


Abreviaturas
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability. 8, 16
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. 7
CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System. 15
DCY Direção de Cyber Security and Privacy. vii
FCUL Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa. vii
FFCUL Fundação da Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa F.P.. vii
MSI Mestrado em Segurança Informática. vii
PT Portugal Telecom. vii, 16
SOC Security Operations Center. ix
VAC Vulnerability Assessment Coordinator. viii
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